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Unlocking the Closet Door: Protecting
Children from Involuntary Civil





I'm 15 and I think I'm gay. I'm really depressed about it. I've even
thought about suicide sometimes. There's nobody I can talk to. I hate
everybody at school. Everybody calls me 'faggot." I've gotten beaten
up a few times. Don't tell me to talk to my parents. I think they al-




This Article assesses how appropriately and effectively the legal
system responds to the potential commitment process faced by the adoles-
cent writing this letter.' When a parent decides to admit a child for inpa-
t This paper draws upon a presentation at the Hastings Law Journal Symposium, Inter-
sexions: The Legal & Social Construction of Sexual Orientation held on March 29, 1997.
* Clinical Supervising Attorney, Hastings College of the Law. B.A., 1975, University
of California, San Diego; J.D., 1981, Western State University College of Law, San Diego
(now Thomas Jefferson School of Law). I greatly appreciate the able and tireless research as-
sistance of Dale Burns (J.D. Candidate, Hastings College of the Law, 1998) and Sonia Martin
(J.D., Hastings College of the Law, 1997), as well as the support of Sarah Colby (J.D., Hast-
ings College of the Law, 1997), Symposium Editor. My deepest thanks to Randi Mandelbaum,
Shauna Marshall, Shannon Minter, Ascanio Piomelli, and Eileen Scallen for much appreciated
comments and support throughout the writing process. I also appreciate the encouragement of
Mark Aaronson.
1. This is a fictionalized letter to an advice columnist. Excerpts from possible responses
to this adolescent's letter will be interspersed throughout this Article.
2. There is no good statistical data reflecting how many children face parental commit-
ment because of their sexual orientation. Shannon Minter, staff attorney for the National Cen-
ter on Lesbian Rights, believes that the problem is not uncommon. He receives an average of
two to three calls per month from gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender or questioning children
who have been threatened with or experienced institutionalization by their parents. Interview
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tient treatment at a mental hospital, many interests are implicated, with
none so vital as the child's interest in avoiding such an extreme loss of
freedom. This Article considers the particular vulnerability of gay, les-
bian, bisexual, transgender, and questioning3 youth in the commitment
process.
Part I summarizes the key holdings of Parham v. J.R.4 and In re
Roger S.,5 the seminal United States Supreme Court and California Su-
preme Court decisions delimiting the due process protections afforded to
children who face commitment. In addition, it discusses California's
anomalous county-by-county implementation of Roger S., as well as the
differing rights applying to public and private inpatient mental facilities.
Part II begins by discussing two premises. First, we live in an age
in which society's attitudes about its gay members are ambivalent and in
flux. Second, the way children in general are treated under the law is
also in flux and inconsistent. Part II asserts that, in light of the fact that
commitment of children due to sexual orientation implicates both of these
premises, the commitment process deserves careful examination. With
this in mind, Part II revisits the basic assumptions made in Parham and
Roger S., with a focus on gay youth.
with Shannon Minter, staff attorney for the National Center on Lesbian Rights, in San Fran-
cisco, Cal. (Dec. 3, 1997). Lyn Duff, who was institutionalized and whose story is recounted
below, stated that about half of the 80 children at the psychiatric facility where she was placed
"had issues of sexual identity." See infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text. See also refer-
ences to anecdotal reports infra note 193.
"Many gay and lesbian youth are still encouraged to 'change' their identities while being
forced into therapy and mental hospitals under the guise of 'treatment.'" Paul Gibson, Gay
Male and Lesbian Youth, in U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERV., 3 PREVENTION AND
INTERVENTIONS IN YOUTH SUICIDE (Marcia R. Feinleib ed., 1989), reprinted in DEATH BY
DENIAL 15, 21 (Gary Remafedi ed., 1994).
The term "commitment" is used to connote involuntary psychiatric inpatient admissions.
When parents admit their children for inpatient care, the admission is deemed to be voluntary
from the state's point of view, as the child's wishes are generally not considered. For the psy-
chiatric inpatient admissions considered here, where a motivating factor is the parents' concern
about, disapproval of or vehement opposition to their child's sexual orientation, it is highly
likely that the child does not wish to receive "treatment" to alter his or her sexual orientation.
Thus, I am using the term "commitment" to highlight the coercive nature of the psychiatric in-
patient admissions based upon sexual orientation. The term "institutionalization" refers to long-
term psychiatric inpatient care.
3. There is no commonly used term to refer collectively to gay, lesbian, bisexual, trans-
gender, and questioning persons. None of the alternatives is perfect, but I have opted to use the
term "gay" as a collective, all-inclusive term.
Some may not be familiar with the term "transgender." Transgender is meant to include
"those who desire to change their gender, are in the process of changing their gender, or have
completed the process of changing their gender." See Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orientation,
Morality, and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. PITT. L. REv. 237, 237 n. 1 (1996).
4. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
5. 569 P.2d 1286 (Cal. 1977).
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Finally, Part I proposes changes which will prevent or curtail
abuse of the commitment process and will extend protections for the vul-
nerable and societally marginalized population of gay youth. These pro-
posals suggest a broad range of solutions, beginning with strengthening
the admission standard employed for inpatient treatment of minors. Ad-
ditional procedural protections are recommended. Finally, enforcement
of current laws and additional research must occur so that future deci-
sions can be made in an informed manner.
I. Existing Law and Procedures: Inconsistent Standards
and Protections
Dear Desperate:
As a fifteen-year-old in California, you have some protections under
the law. If your parents decide to admit you to an inpatient mental hos-
pital in California, you have the right to "protest" this decision. If the
hospital is public, and you are fourteen or older, you have the right to
request a hearing. This hearing must be held prior to admission (but
not necessarily in front of a judge) and you have the right to be repre-
sented by an attorney. If the hospital is private, you have the right to
have an independent clinical review of the decision to admit you, to be
conducted within five days of your request, but you don't have the right
to representation. If the facility is out-of-state, you are not protected by
California law.
A. California's Lanterman-Petris-Short Act
Adults and juvenile wards or dependents6 of the state who are facing
commitment are entitled to protections set forth in the Lanterman-Petris-
Short ("LPS") Act.7 The legislative intent of the Act in relevant part is:
(a) To end the inappropriate, indefinite, and involuntary commitment
of mentally disordered persons,... and to eliminate legal disabilities;
(b) To provide prompt evaluation and treatment of persons with serious
mental disorders... ;
(c) To guarantee and protect public safety;
(d) To safeguard individual rights through judicial review;
(e) To provide individualized treatment, supervision, and placement
services by a conservatorship program for gravely disabled persons;
8
6. Minors can be adjudged wards of the juvenile court based on delinquency, or commis-
sion of crimes or violation of court orders. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 601-02 (West
1984). Minors can be adjudged dependents of the juvenile court if there are findings of abuse
and/or neglect. See § 300(a)-().
7. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000-5150.
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Different procedures and protections apply depending upon the
length of the commitment. After an initial commitment of seventy-two
hours, which is governed by separate statutes for adults and minors,9 a
commitment for an additional fourteen days can be sought. The due pro-
cess protections which apply to adults and children are identical:10 an
automatic certification review proceeding occurs," and the certified per-
son is also entitled to petition the court for habeas corpus review.' 2 At
the certification review, the certified person is entitled to be represented
by counsel or an advocate, to present evidence, to question witnesses,
and to make reasonable requests for the attendance of facility employees
with knowledge of the certification. 3 The hearing is conducted by a
court-appointed commissioner or a referee, or by a certification review
hearing officer. 4 At the certification review, in order to detain the certi-
fied person, the hearing officer must find that there is probable cause to
believe that the person is, as a result of a mental disorder, a danger to
others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled. 5 Should the certi-
fied person request review by habeas corpus, he or she has a right to
counsel, 16 and to challenge findings by a preponderance of the evidence.17
After the 14 day commitment, additional commitments for up to 180
days may be sought.' 8 In some cases, if the certified person is thought to
be gravely disabled, appointment of a conservator may be sought. 9 In
either case, a petition is filed with the court, and a hearing is held.' The
certified person or proposed conservatee is entitled to the right to coun-
sel,2' notice and a judicial hearing,' a jury trial,' and a unanimous ver-
8. § 5001.
9. See §§ 5150 (for adults), 5585 (for minors). There must be probable cause in order to
effect the commitment of either an adult or a minor. §§ 5150, 5585.50. These statutes are
identical with the exception that in the case of minors, authorization for voluntary treatment
must be unavailable in order to proceed under this section, and efforts to notify the minor's par-
ent or legal guardian must occur as soon as possible after the commitment. In addition,
"gravely disabled minor" is statutorily defined. § 5585.25.
10. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5585.53, 5250 (West, WESTLAW through 1997
portion of 1997-98 Reg. Sess. and 1st Ex. Sess.).
11. See§ 5256.
12. See § 5275.
13. See § 5256.4.
14. See § 5256.1.
15. See § 5256.5.
16. See§ 5276.
17. See In re Azzarella, 254 Cal. Rptr. 922 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
18. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5300 (West, WESTLAW through 1997 portion of
1997-98 Reg. Sess. and 1st Ex. Sess.).
19. See § 5350.
20. See §§ 5301, 5303, 5352, 5365.
21. See §§ 5302, 5365.
22. See §§ 5301, 5362.
23. See §§ 5302, 5362.
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dict.' In addition, the standard of proof is proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. 25
B. Parham and Roger S
In contrast to the LPS system governing commitments of adults and
juvenile dependents and wards, children facing commitments by their
parents have fewer protections. In considering challenges to state hospi-
tal commitment decisions by parents involving their children, both the
U.S. Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court reached conclu-
sions which balanced the interests of the child, parents, and state. Par-
ham v. J.R. involved a challenge to Georgia's statute permitting com-
mitments of children under eighteen years of age by their parent or
guardian.27 J.R. had been declared a neglected child at the age of three
months and had been placed in a series of foster homes?8 When he was
seven years old, the state agency which was his guardian committed him
to a state hospital.29 A second appellee, J.L., was committed to a state
hospital at age six by his parents."
While recognizing that children have a protectable interest in being
free from unnecessary bodily restraint,31 the U.S. Supreme Court also
found that "[olur jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civili-
zation concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over
minor children."32 As a result, the Court found that the only due process
protection to which children are entitled is a right to an inquiry by a neu-
tral factfinder to determine whether the statutory requirements for admis-
sion are satisfied.33 The statute at issue provided that a minor could be
admitted "[i]f found to show evidence of mental illness and to be suitable
for treatment. " 34 The inquiry can be an informal proceeding35 and the
factfinder need not be a judicial officer. 36 The opinion was silent on the
24. See Conservatorship of Roulet, 590 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1979); Conservatorship of Davis,
177 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
25. See Roulet, 590 P.2d at 4.
26. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
27. See id. at 588.
28. See id. at 590.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 589.
31. Seeid. at601.
32. Id. at 602.
33. See id. at 606. Parhagm also decided that the same due process rights apply when the
juvenile is a ward of the state. See id. But cf. supra notes 6-25 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing California's treatment of juvenile wards).
34. Parham, 442 U.S. at 588 n.3.
35. See id. at 607.
36. See id.
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issue of the right to representation by counsel. With regard to the stan-
dard of review, the Court stated that "the questions are essentially medi-
cal in character: whether the child is mentally or emotionally ill and
whether he can benefit from the treatment that is provided by the state."37
Two years before Parham, the California Supreme Court in In re
Roger S. anticipated the U.S. Supreme Court by finding that minors
fourteen years old or older have a liberty interest, but that the interest is
not co-extensive with that of adults." The case involved a fourteen-year-
old boy who was hospitalized at Napa State Hospital by his mother and
wanted to be released. However, in an important departure from the
later-decided Parham, the California Supreme Court recognized that par-
ents' right to exercise authority over their children and the right of the
child to independently exercise his or her right to due process may con-
flict. 9 The California Supreme Court went on to provide more protec-
tions to minors than the U.S. Supreme Court provided. The due process
protections to which California minors fourteen and older are entitled
when their parents seek to commit them to public institutions are as fol-
lows: a precommitment hearing after notice; an opportunity to appear
and present evidence; the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses;
a neutral and detached decision-maker; findings by a preponderance of
the evidence; a record of the proceedings; and the right to counsel.4°
However, like Parham, there need not be a judicial hearing and the mi-
nor is not entitled to a jury trial.41 The determination to be made during
the review process is whether "the minor is mentally ill or disordered,
and whether, if the minor is not gravely disabled or dangerous to himself
or others as a result of mental illness or disorder, the admission sought is
likely to benefit him." The findings must be supported by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.43
C. Roger S. Implementation
Roger S. left it to the California state legislature to implement its
mandate:
We shall explain... the basis for our conclusion and, as guidance to
the. Legislature in formulating new statutory procedures to pro-
tect. .. minors [whose parents seek to commit them] against possible
arbitrary admission to mental hospitals, we shall outline those proce-
37. Id. at 609.
38. In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 1290 (Cal. 1977).
39. See id. at 1291-92.
40. See id. at 1296.
41. See id. at 1297.
42. Id. at 1289.
43. See id. at 1296.
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dures which will afford at least those minimum protections to which
they are constitutionally entitled. 44
However, in the years following the decision, the legislature was
unable to agree upon the type of hearing necessary to meet the standards
set forth in the case. Eventually, each county faced a decision whether to
implement its own Roger S. process, or to continue to wait for legislative
direction. A survey conducted in 1982 indicated that most of the re-
sponding counties had decided not to implement special Roger S. hear-
ings.4' Instead, a majority of counties decided to use LPS conservator-
ships as the means to commit minors to state facilities. 46 However, more
than half of these counties allow minors to waive their LPS rights.47
Some counties had already created or were in the process of creating a
special Roger S. hearing to be held before juvenile court judges or com-
missioners.48
From my own recent limited survey of counties, it is difficult to de-
termine whether the policies adopted in the 1980s have been retained.4 9
Of the four counties responding to the survey, only three participated in
the earlier survey in 1982.50 Of those three, two are using the same or
somewhat modified procedures as those adopted in the wake of Roger S.51
The remaining county, Matin, indicated that in 1982 both LPS conser-
44. Id. at 1289.
45. See Carol K. Dillon et al., In re Roger S.: The Impact of a Child's Due Process Vic-
tory on the California Mental Health System, 70 CAL. L. REV. 373, 435-36 and app. B(1)
(1982).
46. See id. 18 of 30 counties responded that LPS conservatorships were being used.
47. See id. 12 of the 18 counties allowed waivers of LPS rights.
48. See id. Three counties had Roger S. procedures; three others were in the process of
implementing them.
49. This survey was a limited follow-up to the survey conducted by Dillon et al., supra
note 45. We posed similar questions. We also asked about county procedures for the admis-
sion of minors to private psychiatric facilities and whether the passage of S.B. 595 had any im-
pact on such admissions. See infra notes 59-67.
The survey was faxed to the Patients' Rights Advocate (or director, chief, or coordinator
of the particular office) for ten of the largest California counties in July and August of 1997.
California Welfare and Institutions Code § 5520 (1984) requires each local mental health direc-
tor to appoint or contract for the services of one or more patients' rights advocates. Their duties
include monitoring mental health facilities for compliance with statutory and regulatory pa-
tients' rights provisions. The ten counties were: Alameda, Los Angeles, Marin, Orange, San
Bernardino, San Diego, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, and Ventura. Responses were
received from four counties: Los Angeles, Marin, San Bernardino, and Ventura. Follow-up
telephone calls were made to these Patients' Rights Advocates to clarify or obtain additional
information.
50. San Bernardino County did not participate in the survey conducted by Dillon et al.,
supra note 45, at 435-36 and app. B(1).
51. Los Angeles and Ventura counties participated in both surveys. See Dillon et al., su-
pra note 45, at 435-36 and app. B(1); supra note 49.
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vatorships and Roger S. hearings were used to obtain commitments.52
Presently, in this county, conservatorships are rarely used, and Roger S.
hearings are not used at all. This is apparently the result of the fact that
currently this county does not consider the state mental hospital as a
treatment option for minors.
Roger S. left open the question of what due process rights attach for
children younger than fourteen years old.53 In practice, since there are
no due process protections in place, parents are able to commit their chil-
dren under fourteen to state inpatient hospitals as long as a physician con-
sents.54 Patients' Rights Advocates responding to the survey55 indicated
that they are not notified when children under the age of fourteen are
hospitalized by their parents in public or private facilities.
D. The Alternative Scheme for Private Hospitals ("S.B. 595")
Neither Parham, Roger S. nor the LPS Act address commitments of
minors to private hospitals. The process available to children, fourteen
and older, whose parents seek to have them admitted to private, as op-
posed to public, facilities came about as a result of a legislative compro-
mise struck in 1989. During the legislative session, two bills concerning
private inpatient commitments of minors were introduced. A.B. 2424,
authored by assemblymember Richard Polanco, and sponsored by the
California Association of Mental Health Patients Rights Advocates
("CAMHPRA"), provided Roger S. type protections for minors between
the ages of fourteen and eighteen, with the exception of a post-, rather
than a pre-, commitment hearing.56 In the same session, Senator Robert
Presley introduced S.B. 595, which was sponsored by hospitals and phy-
sicians.57 It provided for more limited protections of the sort outlined in
Parham. When the bills went to conference committee, the core provi-
52. See Dillon et al., supra note 45, at 435-36 and app. B(1); see also supra notes 50-51.
53. Roger S., 569 P.2d at 1289 n.3. ("We have no occasion in the instant case to consider
the lawfulness of the [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 6000, subdivision (b) admission
procedure as applied to children under 14 years of age.").
54. Judge Stephen M. Lachs has written that "I know of no cases in Los Angeles where
there have been requests for judicial intervention concerning the placing of a minor under four-
teen years of age in a state mental hospital over his protest." Stephen Lachs, Placing Minors in
California Mental Hospitals, 4 WHrrrIER L. REv. 57, 62 (1982).
The discharge data from the State of California Office of Statewide Health Planning and
Development ("OS-PD"), infra note 199, indicates that 9621 and 8165 minors under the age of
14 were committed to inpatient psychiatric care in California county and private facilities in
1990 and 1995, respectively.
55. See supra note 49 for explanation of Patients' Rights Advocate system and description
of survey methodology.
56. See Comm. Rep. A.B. 1276 (Cal. Apr. 23, 1991).
57. See id.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol.48
sions of S.B. 595 were preserved and became effective on January 1,
1990.
51
S.B. 595 was codified in the Welfare and Institutions Code. 59 The
due process requirements only apply to private mental health facilities
where the costs of treatment are paid or reimbursed by a private insurer
or private health service plan.' The review is held after the child has
been admitted,6" within five days of a request.62 If there is no request, a
review does not take place. 6 The independent review is conducted by a
psychiatrist.' The standard of review also differs from the Roger S.
standard. The commitment decision can be affirmed if there is a finding
that the treatment is "reasonably likely to be beneficial. "6' In making the
determination, the reviewing psychiatrist conducts a private interview
with the minor at which an advocate is permitted to be present.' Finally,
the statute specifically provides that there is no right to representation by
counsel during the review process. 67
Thus, in California, the extent of minors' due process rights depends
on the following: the age of the minor, who is trying to commit the mi-
nor, whether the commitment sought is to a public or private facility, and
who is paying for the treatment.68
It. The Unique Impact of Existing Law and Procedures
on Gay Youth
Dear Desperate, continued:
Children in your situation often feel confused and frightened, espe-
cially today. Some parents and segments of society feel very strongly
that being homosexual, bisexual or transgender is morally wrong or ab-
normal. Others think that there's nothing wrong with being homosex-
ual, bisexual or transgender, and that it's societal intolerance that
causes many gay youth to be unhappy. In either case, parents have a
58. See Comm. Rep. A.B. 1276 (Cal. July 17, 1991).
59. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6002.10-.40 (West, WESTLAW through 1997
portion of 1997-98 Reg. Sess. and 1st Ex. Sess.).
60. See § 6002.40(b). This means that commitments by parents where treatments are paid
for directly by the parent are not subject to any procedural protections.
61. See § 6002.20.
62. See § 6002.30(d).
63. See § 6002.15(b) (requiring minors to be advised of their right to an independent clini-
cal review).
64. See § 6002.25.
65. § 6002.30(c).
66. See § 6002.30(a), (e).
67. See § 6002.30(i).
68. Ironically, this is an arena in which poor children have substantially greater protec-
tions than rich children.
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great deal of power to control your life. You should also know that the
official position of the American Psychiatric Association is that homo-
sexuality is not a mental disorder.
Assuming for the moment that your parents decide to try to commit
you to a mental hospital, you have the right to challenge this decision.
Only you can decide whether to exercise this right or not. You might
think about whether you think the treatment you'll receive will be helpful
to you and whether the alternatives are any better-will you be sent
back home, or is there another placement? How do you feel about op-
posing your parents' wishes? What is the motivation behind your par-
ents' decision? How do they feel about homosexuality? Are they really
acting with your best interests at heart? How do you feel about the
doctors you've been seeing, if any? What does their attitude toward
homosexuality seem to be? Finally, how do you feel about homosexual-
ity? Do you want help getting used to your homosexuality, or do you
want help dealing with your confusion about your sexual orientation?
In assessing the effectiveness and appropriateness of the commitment
process for gay children, it is important to understand the social climate
surrounding sexual minorities, as well as the law's attitude toward chil-
dren in general.
A. Changing Social and Legal Context for Gays
Today, the topic of homosexuality is out of the closet. The rightful
place of those who are gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender is openly
discussed in many different contexts. Should gays be allowed to serve in
the military,69 should they be protected from workplace discrimination,'
should they be allowed to marry, 71 are they fit as parents,' or do they
represent an abomination?' These are all issues that are being widely
debated among policymakers, in the courts, in the media, and among
many members of society in general.
But open debate does not bring instant acceptance or tolerance. A
recent poll in California found that a majority of those polled favor
69. For example, negative reactions came from both ends of the political spectrum in re-
sponse to President Clinton's announcement of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy applying to
gays in the military.
70. See, e.g., infra notes 85-86.
71. See, e.g., infra notes 75 and 81-83.
72. For example, states vary as to whether adoptions by openly gay persons are permitted.
See Nancy D. Polikoff, Resisting "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" in the Licensing of Lesbian and Gay
Foster Parents: Why Openness Will Benefit Lesbian and Gay Youth, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1183
(1997).
73. For example, Promise Keepers founder Bill McCartney has called homosexuality an
"abomination of Almighty God." Beth Myers, NOW Promises "No Surrender" to Right-Wing
Promise Keepers, NATIONAL TIMEs, Oct. 1997, at 1.
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granting legal recognition to gay domestic partners in areas such as hos-
pital visitation rights, medical powers of attorney and conservatorships,
and granting status to domestic partners to receive benefits such as pen-
sions, health and dental care coverage, family leave, and death benefits.74
The same poll found, however, that a majority opposed having a law
permitting gays to marry members of their own sex and having regular
marriage laws applied to them.75 The results of this poll seem to reflect a
growing tolerance, but far from total acceptance, of the legitimacy of gay
relationships.
Ironically, disapproval and intolerance of homosexuality is arguably
increasing at the same time acceptance is growing. Klanwatch, a project
of the Southern Poverty Law Center, publishes Intelligence Report. It
compiles reports of incidents of violence, including those directed toward
gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people. A collation of reports
from the last several issues of Intelligence Report shows that approxi-
mately 9% of the reports indicated that sexual orientation or perceived
sexual orientation of the victim was a motivating factor in the incident.7 6
Incidents of hate crimes, generally, are on the increase.'
Societal ambivalence about homosexuality is reflected in the legal
sphere as well. In 1960, all fifty states and the District of Columbia out-
lawed sodomy.78 Since 1960, thirty states have decriminalized it.79 Some
communities have voted to offer domestic partner benefits to their resi-
74. 67% of those polled favored granting legal recognition to domestic partners in areas of
family rights such as hospital visitation rights, medical powers of attorney, and conservator-
ships. 59% favored granting financial dependence status to domestic partners to receive bene-
fits such as pensions, health and dental care coverage, and family leave and death benefits. See
Kenneth J. Garcia, Caifornians Accepting Gay Rights, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 3, 1997, at Al (re-
porting on the results of the Field Poll, conducted between Feb. 11 and 17, 1997).
75. 56% of those polled disapproved of a law permitting homosexuals to marry members
of their own sex with regular marriage laws applied to them. See id.
76. Reports mentioning sexual orientation of the victim were tallied from the reports pub-
lished in the Winter, Spring, and Summer 1997 issues of Intelligence Report. Of 710 total inci-
dents, 64 indicated that sexual orientation was a motivating factor. See Bias Incidents,
INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Winter 1997, at 23, 23-34; For the Record, INTELLIGENCE REPORT,
Winter 1997, at 35, 35-39; For the Record, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Summer 1997, at 19, 19-
27; For the Record, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Spring 1997, at 31, 31-35. INTELLIGENCE
REPORT draws its summaries from media and law enforcement reports. They state that "statis-
tics on hate crimes are unreliable, because many bias-motivated crimes are not reported to law
enforcement, and law enforcement monitoring of hate crimes varies from state to state." Bias
Incidents, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Winter 1997, at 23, 23.
77. Clinton Declares 'All-Out Assault on Hate Crimes, 'WASH. POST, June 8, 1997, at A6
(citing FBI statistics showing a 42% rise in reported hate crimes from 1991 to 1995).
78. See ROBERT WINTEMUTE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 20 (1995).
Sodomy laws make it a crime to engage in all oral or anal intercourse, between men, between
women, or between a man and a woman.
79. See National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Montana Supreme Court Strikes Down
State's Sodomy Law (visited Feb. 3, 1997) <http://www.ngltf.org/press/mont-sod.html>.
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dents. 80 On the other hand, last year, Congress passed, and President
Clinton signed into law, the Defense of Marriage Act.81 This law, which
explicitly defines marriage as between a woman and a man, was passed
in reaction to the Hawaii marriage case, Baehr v. Miike.S3 Baehr has in
turn spawned passage in Hawaii of a very broad state-wide domestic
partner benefits bill which became effective on July 1, 1997. 4 This ses-
sion, Congress will reconsider the Employment Non-Discrimination
Act,85 which narrowly failed to pass the Senate last session.86
The U.S. Supreme Court has not been immune from society's am-
bivalence toward gays. In 1986 Bowers v. Hardwick7 held that sodomy
statutes, such as the one challenged by a gay man who was prosecuted
under Georgia's statute, are constitutional, because they do not violate
the right to privacy.88 Ten years later, in 1996, the Court in Romer v.
80. The National Gay Lesbian Task Force posted "A Sampling of Domestic Partner Bene-
fits" dated July 15, 1996, at its website. It lists approximately 158 private companies, 44 pub-
lic sector entities, 69 universities and colleges, 27 non-profit organizations, and 24 labor or-
ganizations as offering some form of domestic partner benefits. The listing does not purport to
be complete. National Gay Lesbian Task Force, A Sampling of Domestic Partner Benefits (last
modified July 15, 1996) <http://www.ngtlf.org/pubs/dpbene.html>.
81. Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, Public Law 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 1
U.S.C.A. § 1, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West 1997 & Supp. 1998).
82. Section 3 of the Act adds a definition of "marriage" and "spouse" to Chapter 1, Title
1 of the United States Code. 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West 1997). This definition provides that "[i]n
determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation
of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word 'marriage'
means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word
'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." Id.
83. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). Plaintiffs applied for and were denied
marriage licenses because Hawaii Revised Statutes § 572-1 (1985) (amended 1997) (governing
issuance of marriage licenses) was interpreted to apply to opposite sex couples. See id. at 48-
50. Plaintiffs filed an action seeking declarative relief as to the construction and application of
Hawaii Revised Statutes § 572-1. See id. The Hawaii Supreme Court remanded the case to the
circuit court for further proceedings. See id. at 68. "On remand, in accordance with the "strict
scrutiny" standard, the burden will rest on [Defendant] to overcome the presumption that HRS
§ 572-1 is unconstitutional by demonstrating that it furthers compelling state interests and is
narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgments of constitutional rights." Id.
84. HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 572C-1 to -7 (1997). The so-called "Reciprocal Beneficiaries"
or "Reciprocal Benefits" bill purports to extend benefits to couples who are precluded by law
from marrying. Id. Among the benefits covered are rights to inheritance, retirement benefici-
ary benefits, and health-related benefits. Id.
85. The House version, H.R. 1858, was introduced by Congressmember Christopher
Shays (R-CT), and 152 co-sponsors. H.R. 1858, 105th Cong. (1997). The Senate version, S.
869 was introduced by Senator James Jeffords (R-VT), and 33 co-sponsors. S. 869, 105th
Cong. (1997).
86. S. 2056, 104th Cong. (1996) (failed to pass the Senate by a vote of 50 to 49 on Sept.
30, 1996).
87. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
88. See id. at 189.
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Evans89 found that a state constitutional amendment precluding any gov-
ernmental action designed to protect "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual
orientation" was violative of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protec-
tion clause.' In its six to three majority opinion, the Court found Colo-
rado's constitutional amendment "classifies homosexuals not to further a
proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else."91 In
his dissent, Justice Scalia described the majority opinion as contradicting
Bowers and "plac[ing] the prestige of this institution behind the proposi-
tion that opposition to homosexuality is as reprehensible as racial or re-
ligious bias. "'
Children today are often victims of the high visibility of, and widely
divergent attitudes toward, gay issues. While there are indications that
greater societal tolerance and visibility of gay issues has resulted in chil-
dren "coming out" at an earlier age, these children may be subjected to
open hostility; hatred in arenas which ought to provide a safe and secure
environment; and intolerance, often within their own families, schools,
and communities. 3 In particular, schools are notoriously ignorant of,
and/or hostile toward, their gay students, and in some cases school offi-
cials permit harassment and/or violence toward them.'
89. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)
90. See id. at 1624.
91. Id. at 1629.
92. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93. See Anthony R. D'Augelli & Scott L. Hershberger, Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Youth
in Community Settings: Personal Challenges and Mental Health Problems, 21 AM. J.
COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY 421, 422 (1993).
94. See, e.g., Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996) (describing how Jamie
Nabozny was continually harassed and physically abused by fellow students because of his ho-
mosexuality throughout middle and high school). There was evidence to suggest that some
school administrators did not take Nabozny's predicament seriously. See id. at 449.
The Safe Schools Project is a five-year study being conducted state-wide in Washington
State. The third annual report of the study published in Fall 1996 reports on the results of a
survey of 8400 Seattle high school students. Students who described themselves as gay, lesbian
or bisexual were significantly more likely than their heterosexual peers to report the following:
having been the target of anti-gay harassment or violence at school or on the way to or from
school; having been threatened or injured by someone with a weapon at school in the past year;
having been injured in a fight in the last year severely enough to have been treated by a doctor
or a nurse; feeling unsafe or afraid at school some, most or all of the time; and, having missed
at least one day of school in the past month because they felt unsafe. See Safe Schools Anti-
Violence Documentation Project, Third Annual Report, Executive Summary: Fall 1996 (visited
Feb. 19, 1997) <http://members.tripod.com/-claytoly/sspexecsum>.
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B. Changing and Conflicting Treatment of Children Under the Law,
Generally
Just as society and its laws regard sexual minorities with ambiva-
lence, society and its laws also regard children with mixed feelings. In
certain situations, children, beginning at age fourteen, can be treated as
adults. Emancipation statutes are available to minors as young as four-
teen years old. If a certain showing is made, a minor can be emancipated
from the control of his or her parents, and is thereafter treated as an
adult.95 Children as young as fourteen years old who are accused of
committing some offenses may be tried as adults.
96
In other contexts, minors are subject to constraints imposed by the
state or their parents which differ from those which can be imposed upon
adults. Minors are restricted in their ability to obtain driver's licenses,'
to enter into binding contracts," to purchase alcoholic beverages" or to-
bacco products, 1°° and must attend school.'01 Children are also subject to
curfew laws,"°2 and other status offenses0 3 for which adults cannot be
punished.
The factors affecting how children will be treated in any given situa-
tion vary greatly. Children's rights as autonomous persons are greatly
tempered by a number of competing interests: among them the right of
parents to raise their children as they see fit, state interests such as en-
suring that children have minimum levels of education, and a recognition
that children are still developing judgment and decision-making capabili-
ties. However, it is clear that children's capacities to make good deci-
sions for themselves are not the overriding concern in crafting laws or
defining circumstances in which children are deemed to be able to act on
their own behalf or are to be treated as adults.
A recent California Supreme Court decision illustrates this point,
and has broader implications for the commitment issue considered here.
In American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, " the court, in a four to
95. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7000-7143 (West 1994).
96. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 707-707.4 (West 1984).
97. CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 17700, 17701 (West 1971).
98. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1556 (West 1982).
99. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25658 (West 1997).
100. CAL. PENAL CODE § 308(b) (West 1988).
101. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49100 (West 1993).
102. See In re Nancy C., 105 Cal. Rptr. 113 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
103. For example, unmarried minors cannot legally consent to sexual intercourse. See
CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West 1988). This is California's statutory rape law. Under Wel-
fare & Institutions Code § 601(b) (1984), a minor can be adjudged a ward of the court if the
minor has four or more truancies within one school year, or for persistent or habitual refusal to
obey the reasonable and proper orders or directions of school authorities.
104. 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997).
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three plurality decision, held that California's parental notification or ju-
dicial bypass petition requirement for all unemancipated minors to obtain
abortions was unconstitutional. °5 The plurality opinion found that the
State had failed to establish that its compelling interest in protecting both
the health of the minor and the parent-child relationship was furthered by
a law requiring parental notification or judicial authorization prior to a
minor obtaining an abortion. 1°6 In support of its decision, the court con-
sidered the numerous, analogous California statutory provisions author-
izing a minor, without parental consent, to make medical and other sig-
nificant decisions with regard to her own and her child's health and
future. t In addition, the court cited overwhelming evidence introduced
at trial that the parental notice or judicial bypass process would injure the
interests of the minor's health and the parent-child relationship. 18 Most
relevantly, the court held that an unemancipated minor's privacy right
when making a decision to have an abortion is similar to an adult's.' °9
The court went on to state that
because the decision whether to continue or terminate her pregnancy
has such a substantial effect on a pregnant minor's control over her per-
sonal bodily integrity, has such serious long-term consequences in de-
ter-mining her life choices, is so central to the preservation of her abil-
ity to define and adhere to her ultimate values regarding the meaning of
human existence and life, and (unlike many other choices) is a decision
that cannot be postponed until adulthood, we conclude that a minor who
is pregnant has a protected privacy interest under the California Consti-
tution in making the decision whether to continue or to terminate her
own pregnancy - and that this interest is intruded upon by the provi-
sions of [the parental consent or judicial bypass statute].110
For a bare majority of the current California Supreme Court, the
balance among the interests of children, parents, and the state favored the
privacy right of children. The court was particularly persuaded by the
nature of the decision being weighed, that is, whether to terminate a
pregnancy. The court also deferred to medical personnel to make the in-
dividual determination of the minor's capacity to make an informed deci-
105. See id. at 800.
106. See id. at 828.
107. See id. at 815. The court noted that the statute being challenged, California Family
Code § 6925 (West 1994), permitted unmarried pregnant minors to obtain medical care related
to pregnancy without parental consent. See id. at 815. The court also cited statutes which per-
mit minors, 12 and older, without parental consent, to seek out treatment for infectious dis-
eases, including sexually transmitted diseases (§ 6926), treatment for rape (§ 6927), treatment
for drug or alcohol abuse (§ 6929) and mental health treatment on an outpatient basis (§ 6924).
See id. at 827, 830. California Family Code § 6928 allows a minor of any age and without pa-
rental consent, to seek medical care for sexual assault. See id. at 827.
108. See id. at 802.
109. See id. at 816 & n.21.
110. See id. at 816.
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sion. The separate dissents by Justices Mosk, Baxter, and Brown argued
that the balancing should have favored the interests of parents or the state
over those of the minor. Thus, while there was much testimony at trial
as to the capacity of minors to make competent decisions on their own,
the plurality seemed less persuaded by such testimony than by the pro-
found nature of the decision and rights at stake. Similarly, the dissenting
justices seemed unpersuaded that the capacity of minors ought to be a
consideration at all, given the other, "superior" interests at stake.
Of particular note is Justice Mosk's heavy reliance upon the reason-
ing in Roger S. in his dissent. After summarizing the principles which
could be derived from Roger S., he applied them to the abortion context.
Justice Mosk argued that the minor's right to privacy, much like a mi-
nor's liberty right, is more limited than an adult's, and is subject to inter-
ference by the state."' However, he cautioned that, as with the commit-
ment decision, the state's interference with the minor's exercise of the
right to decide whether to obtain an abortion may be detrimental to the
minor."' As such, procedures which are imposed must protect minors
from arbitrary or drastic interference with their rights.' As in Roger S.
he concluded that since a minor's rights are subject to greater restrictions
than adults that in this case, parental consent or notice, or judicial
authorization, while not appropriate for adult women, are appropriate re-
strictions for minors.114
Justice Mosk implied that American Academy of Pediatrics set the
court on a collision course with its decision in Roger S. Indeed, Ameri-
can Academy of Pediatrics could well pave the way for increasing the due
process protections to which minors are entitled. The liberty right impli-
cated in the commitment decision is similar to the privacy right impli-
cated in the decision to obtain an abortion. As with the abortion decision,
commitment has a "substantial effect on a... minor's control over her
personal bodily integrity, has. . . serious long-term conse-
quences... and is... central to the preservation of her ability to define
and adhere to her ultimate values regarding the meaning of human exis-
tence and life."" 5 These arguments support revisiting Roger S. to expand
the scope of American Academy of Pediatrics to protect gay children
from unwarranted commitment decisions.
111. See id. at 854 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
112. See id. at 856 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
113. See id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
114. See id. at 857 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 816.
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C. Critique of Parham, Roger S., and S. B. 595 with Regard to Gay Youth
In reaching its decisions in Parham and Roger S., the U.S. and Cali-
fornia Supreme Courts relied upon a series of assumptions which have
been heavily criticized by academics. 116 Several key criticisms will be
revisited briefly, and will then be scrutinized with regard to gay youth.
(1) Assumption that Commitment Decision is Purely a Medical Decision
Which Medical Experts Are in the Best Position to Make
a. Lack of admissions standards for minors
Parham and Roger S. acknowledge the unreliability of mental health
diagnoses of, and prognoses for, children. "[W]e note again the uncer-
tainties in psychiatric diagnosis and the divergence of expert views which
render the possibility of mistake significantly greater than in diagnosis of
physical illness."117 "[W]e acknowledge the fallibility of medical and
psychiatric diagnosis. "118
Nevertheless, in Parham, commitment decisions were held to be
medical decisions which are best left to experts in the field. "[W]e do
not accept the notion that the shortcomings of specialists can always be
avoided by shifting the decision from a trained specialist using the tradi-
tional tools of medical science to an untrained judge or administrative
hearing officer after a judicial-type hearing."" 9 Roger S. diverged from
this view, expressing concern about erroneous diagnoses and finding that
the screening procedure employed by the hospitals was insufficient to
meet due process requirements."n
116. See John H. Garvey, Children and the Idea of Liberty: A Comment on the Civil Com-
mitment Cases, 68 KY. L.J. 809 (1979-80); Allen Edward Shoenberger, "Voluntary" Commit-
ment of Mentally Ill or Retarded Children: Child Abuse by the Supreme Court, 7 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 1 (1981); Sidney S. Hollar, The Never-Never Land of Mental Health Law: A Review
of the Legal Rights of Youth Committed by Their Parents to Psychiatric Facilities in California,
4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 300 (1988-89); Katharine A. Butler, A Chance to be Heard: An
Application of Bellotti v. Baird to the Civil Commitment of Minors, 32 HASTINGS L. J. 1285
(1981); Malissa D. McKeith, Children's Inpatient Mental Health Treatment: Extending Due
Process to All Commitment Procedures, 17 U.S.F. L. REV. 797 (1983); Kelli Schmidt, "Who
are you to say what my best interest is?" Minors' Due Process Rights when Admitted by Parents
for Inpatient Mental Health Treatment, 71 WASH. L. REv. 1187 (1996). Much of this work
was influenced by James W. Ellis, whose seminal article was cited in the Parham and Roger S.
decisions. See James W. Ellis, Volunteering Children: Parental Commitment of Minors to
Mental Institutions, 62 CAL. L. REv. 840 (1974).
117. In Re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 1290 (Cal. 1977) (citation omitted).
118. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 (citation omitted).
119. Id.
120. Roger S., 569 P.2d at 1295-96.
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The concern expressed in Roger S. is well founded. Critics have
pointed out that, unlike the situation for adults, there are no widely ac-
cepted standards for adolescent admissions for inpatient care. 2 1  Thus,
inpatient admission decisions can be made in inconsistent and unpredict-
able ways, depending on the facility and the medical personnel. Lois
Weithorn's article describes one set of admission criteria:
The National Association of Private Psychiatric Hospitals
("NAPPH")... publishes criteria that could be used to justify the hos-
pitalization of most troublesome, and many not-so-troublesome, juve-
niles. Not only do these criteria cite "sexual promiscuity" as an exam-
ple of "self-defeating" and/or "self-destructive" behavior necessitating
"immediate acute-care hospitalization [as] the only reasonable interven-
tion," but they fail to define what type of sexual activity constitutes
"promiscuity." Such a standard allows anyone using the guidelines to
apply personal moral standards in making admission decisions. No link
between the sexual activity and a basic mental disturbance must be
demonstrated prior to admission; the link apparently is presumed. The
NAPPH criteria mention as another justification for hospitalization "in-
ability to function" in one of the following areas: family life, voca-
tional pursuits, and "choice of community resources." The commen-
tary accompanying the criteria implies that teenagers who prefer certain
nonfavored social activities (such as listening to punk rock music) over
attending scout or church youth group meetings may be making a suffi-
ciently poor "choice of community resources" to justify his hospitaliza-
tion.12
In failing to acknowledge the lack of standards for adolescent inpa-
tient admissions, both Parham and Roger S. overlooked the even greater
potential for erroneous admissions of adolescents than for adults. The
lack of standards suggests the need for stronger, not weaker, oversight
protections.
b. Conflict within medical community over homosexuality
Most important for gay children is the controversy within the medi-
cal profession about the nature of sexual orientation. This is illustrated
by reviewing some of the changes to the Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual of Mental Disorders' ("DSM") over the last twenty-five years. In
1973, the Board of Trustees of the American Psychiatric Association,
121. See Lois L. Weithom, Mental Hospitalization of Troublesome Youth: An Analysis of
Skyrocketing Admission Rates, 40 STAN. L. REV. 773, 785 (1988).
122. Id. at 780 (citations omitted).
123. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is described as "widely
accepted in the United States as the common language of mental health clinicians and research-
ers for communicating about [mental] disorders." AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS [hereinafter DSM] xviii (3d
ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III-R].
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which publishes the DSM, voted to eliminate homosexuality per se as a
mental disorder and to substitute a new category, Sexual Orientation
Disturbance. The removal of homosexuality per se in the third edition of
the DSM ("DSM-llI") was supported by the following rationale:
The crucial issue in determining whether or not homosexuality per se
should be regarded as a mental disorder is not the etiology of the condi-
tion, but its consequences and the definition of mental disorder. A sig-
nificant portion of homosexuals are apparently satisfied with their sex-
ual orientation, show no significant signs of manifest psychopathology
(unless homosexuality, by itself, is considered psychopathology), and
are able to function socially and occupationally with no impairment. If
one uses the criteria of distress or disability, homosexuality per se is not
a mental disorder. If one uses the criterion of inherent disadvantage, it
is not at all clear that homosexuality is a disadvantage in all cultures or
subcultures.1
24
The new category of Sexual Orientation Disturbance applied to those
homosexuals who are "disturbed by, in conflict with, or wish to change
their sexual orientation. " 125
In 1980, the third edition of the DSM ("DSM-HI") was published.
The DSM-HI continued the 1973 elimination of homosexuality but
changed the category of Sexual Orientation Disturbance to "Ego-dystonic
homosexuality."'" The category of "Gender identity disorder of child-
hood" was also added to the DSM-HI.' 27 The DSM-Ill did not give any
explanation for this second addition."
124. DSM, app. C at 380 (3d ed.1980) [hereinafter DSM-III].
125. Id.
126. Id. ("The change in terminology was made to make it clear that the category is limited
to individuals with a homosexual arousal pattern.")
127. See id. at 264.
The essential features are a persistent feeling of discomfort and inappropriateness in a
child about his or her anatomic sex and the desire to be, or the insistence that he or
she is, of the other sex ....
Girls with this disorder regularly have male peer groups, an avid interest in sports
and rough-and-tumble play, and a lack of interest in playing with dolls or playing
"house" (unless playing the father or another male role)....
Boys with this disorder invariably are preoccupied with female stereotypical ac-
tivities. The may have a preference for dressing in girls' or women's clothes ....
Dolls are often the favorite toy .... Rough-and-tumble play or sports are regularly
avoided.
Id.
128. See id., app. C at 380 (comparing the listings appearing in the DSM-I and DSM-III).
In addition, it includes comments that attempt to explain the reasons for major changes to the
DSM-II classification, terminology, or definitions of the categories. See id. No explanation is
provided for the addition of gender identity disorder of childhood. See id. The appendix cites
Richard Green's work entitled SEXUAL IDENTITY CONFLICT IN CHILDREN AND ADULTS (1975).
See id.
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In 1987, the DSM-Im was revised ("DSM-I-R") and eliminated
ego-dystonic homosexuality as a disorder.
This category has been eliminated for several reasons. It suggested to
some that homosexuality itself was considered a disorder. In the United
States almost all people who are homosexual first go through a phase in
which their homosexuality is ego-dystonic. Furthermore, the diagnosis
of Ego-dystonic Homosexuality has rarely been used clinically and there
have been only a few articles in the scientific literature that use the con-
cept."
129
In addition, the DSM-m-R re-classified gender identity disorders as
falling within a subclass of "Disorders Usually First Evident in Infancy,
Childhood, or Adolescence." This was justified because the symptoms
of Gender Identity Disorder ("GID") almost always begin in childhood.3
Finally, the fourth and latest edition of the DSM, ("DSM-IV"),
published in 1994, eliminated transsexualism"' as a separate disorder,
and subsumed it within GID. 132 In addition, the new, combined category
was moved from the section called "Disorders Usually First Evident in
Infancy, Childhood, or Adolescence" to the category called "Sexual and
Gender Identity Disorders." These changes followed a reappraisal of the
diagnostic criteria prescribing who should have sex reassignment surgery
and in particular, the findings that the discrete categories of "transsex-
ualism" and "gender identity disorder of adolescence or adulthood, non-
transsexual type" in the DSM-III-R were no longer justified.
33
These changes in the DSM over the last twenty-four years are re-
flective of the underlying controversy within the medical community
129. See DSM-III-R, app. D at 426.
130. See id. at 424.
131. In the DSM-m, the diagnostic criteria for transsexualism were: "[a] [s]ense of dis-
comfort and inappropriateness about one's anatomic sex[; a] [w]ish to be rid of one's own
genitals and to live as a member of the other sex[; and that] [t]he disturbance has been continu-
ous (not limited to periods of stress) for at least two years." DSM-m at 263.
132. 3 DSM SOURCEBOOK 318-19 (4th ed. 1997) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
133. The DSM-inI-R categories of "transsexualism" and "gender identity disorder of ado-
lescence or adulthood, nontranssexual type" are
similar except that transsexualism appears to describe gender-dysphoric individuals
who have decided on surgical sex reassignment as the solution to their inner distress.
The desire to uncouple the clinical diagnosis of gender dysphoria from criteria for ap-
proving patients for sex reassignment surgery was one factor in the subcommittee's
recommendation that these categories be merged under the heading of gender identity
disorder. It is also the perception of many clinicians that there are no distinct bounda-
ries between patients with gender dysphoria who request sex reassignment surgery and
those whose cross-gender wishes are of lesser intensity or constancy. This viewpoint,
which reflects clinical experience over a number of years, has led to the belief that
there is no longer a justification for maintaining discrete categories within the broad
category of gender identity disorder.
DSM-IV at 318 (citations omitted).
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about homosexuality and GID. Some mental health professionals believe
that GID is a precursor to homosexuality or transsexualism, and disagree
with the elimination of homosexuality from the DSM. They assert that if
GID in children is successfully treated, then homosexuality and transsex-
ualism can be prevented. 1" One of the principal proponents of this posi-
tion is George A. Rekers, Ph.D., a Professor of Neuropsychiatry and
Behavioral Science, Research Director for Child and Adolescent Psy-
chiatry, and Chairman of Faculty in Psychology at the University of
South Carolina School of Medicine in Columbia, South Carolina. Dr.
Rekers has written numerous articles and book chapters about gender
identity and development of sexuality in children.135 He is the editor of a
1995 book entitled Handbook of Child and Adolescent Sexual Prob-
lems.136 In justifying intervention in cases of what he terms "Gender
Role Behavior Disturbance" and "Cross Gender Identification Distur-
bance" to prevent transsexualism and homosexuality, Dr. Rekers proffers
three additional reasons: "the psychological maladjustment of gender
disturbed children;" "to prevent the serious emotional, social, and eco-
nomic maladjustments secondary to severe adulthood sexual problems;"
and, "to cooperate with appropriate parental concern over gender devi-
ance. " 137
134. "There are numerous interrelated reasons for intervening in the life of a boy diagnosed
with a gender disturbance .... [One reason] is to prevent severe sexual problems of adulthood
such as transsexualism and homosexuality that are highly resistant to treatment in later phases of
development." George A. Rekers, Gender Identity Disorder, J. HUM. SEXUALITY (visited
Mar. 20, 1998) <http://www.leaderv.com/jhs/rekers.html>. "We know that obligatory ho-
mosexuals are caught up in unconscious adaptations to early childhood abuse and neglect and
that, with insight into their earliest beginnings, they can change." Charles W. Socarides, How
America Went Gay, J. HUM. SEXUALITY (visited Mar. 20, 1998) <http://www.leaderv.
com/jhs/socarides.html>. "Two short term goals have been discussed in the literature: the
reduction or elimination of social ostracism and conflict and the alleviation of underlying or
associated psychopathology. Longer term goals have focused on the prevention of transsexual-
ism and/or homosexuality." Susan J. Bradley & Kenneth J. Zucker, Gender Identity Disorder
and Psychosexual Problems in Children and Adolescents, 35 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 477 (1990).
135. See, e.g., George A. Rekers, Assessment and Treatment of Childhood Gender Prob-
lems, in 1 ADVANCES IN CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 267 (B. B. Lahey & A. E. Kazdin
eds., 1977); George A. Rekers, Sexual Problems: Behavior Modification, in HANDBOOK OF
TREATMENT OF MENTAL DISORDERS IN CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE 268 (B. B. Wolman
ed., 1978); George A. Rekers, Psychosexual and Gender Problems, in BEHAVIORAL
ASSESSMENT OF CHILDHOOD DISORDERS 483 (E. J. Mash & L. G. Terdal eds., 1981); George
A. Rekers, Gender Identity Problems, in HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL BEHAVIOR THERAPY WITH
CHILDREN 658 (Philip H. Borstein & Alan E. Kazdin eds., 1985); George A. Rekers, Psycho-
sexual Assessment of Gender Identity Disorders, in 4 ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ASSESSMENT
OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 33 (R. J. Prinz ed., 1988).
136. HANDBOOK OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT SEXUAL PROBLEMS (George A. Rekers ed.,
1995).
137. Rekers, supra note 134.
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In terms of treatment options for children with GID, many different
options are reported in the literature."' For example, Dr. Rekers has
written about use of behavior therapy, which focuses on techniques to
modify specific sex-typed behaviors, such as cross-dressing and exclusive
play with opposite-sex toys.139
Dr. Rekers' views represent a minority among health profession-
als." In the 1995 edition of Treatments of Psychiatric Disorders the
chapter entitled "Gender Identity Disorder in Children" begins: "Both
the diagnosis and the treatment of gender identity disorder in children
remain controversial. Not only is there dispute over what constitutes
each, but debate continues over whether either is justified. " 141 This
chapter is written by Dr. Richard Green, who has both a law degree and
a medical degree. He has been doing work in the area of GID in children
since the 1960s.2 He was one of several researchers who conducted re-
search on GID at UCLA in the mid-70s.143 His chapter on GID in chil-
dren closes with this statement:
From the foregoing it should be apparent that goals of intervention in
gender identity disorder families are limited. There is no convincing
data that anything the therapist does can modify the direction of sexual
orientation (typically the parents' primary concern). However, inter-
vention may serve a positive purpose. The pediatric culture remains
sexist. Markedly gender role atypical children are teased and rejected.
The children are unhappy being who they are and are unhappy socially.
Their relationships with parents, notably parents of the same gender,
are strained. Intervening to modify these sources of discontent is a
138. "Treatment of children with gender identity disorder has been approached from di-
verse conceptual orientations, including behavior therapy, psychotherapy, parent counseling,
family therapy, group therapy and eclectic combinations." Kenneth Zucker & Richard Green,
Psychosexual Disorders in Children and Adolescents, 33 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY
107, 137 (1992).
139. See George A. Rekers, et al., Long-Term Effects of Treatment for Gender Identity
Disorder of Childhood, 3 J. PSYCHIATRY & HUM. SEXUALrrY 121, 124-25 (1990). Dr. Rekers
is a reported proponent of aversion therapy, in which "non-conforming" gender behavior is
punished, and "gender appropriate" behavior is rewarded. See Carolyn Lochhead, Conserva-
tives Brand Homosexuality a 'Tragic Affliction,' S.F. CHRON., June 20, 1997, at A4.
140. "mhe current literature and the vast majority of scholars in this field state that one's
sexual orientation is not a choice, that is, individuals no more choose to be homosexual than
heterosexual." Roberta K. Beach, Homosexuality and Adolescence, 92 PEDIATRICS 631, 631
(1993) (citations omitted). Cf. Socarides, supra note 134 ("For more than 20 years, I and a
few of my colleagues in the field of psychoanalysis have felt like an embattled minority, be-
cause we have continued to insist, against today's conventional wisdom, that gays aren't born
that way.").
141. Richard Green, Gender Identity Disorder in Children, in TREATMENTS OF
PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS 2001, 2002 (Glen 0. Gabbard ed., 1995).
142. RICHARD GREEN, THE "Sissy BOY SYNDROME" AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
HOMOSEXUALITY 370 (1987).
143. PHYLLIS BURKE, GENDER SHOCK 32-33 (1996).
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worthwhile and workable goal with motivated families. Perhaps if
Western culture accommodated gender-deviant children... interven-
tion would be unwarranted. 144
Some health professionals go further than Dr. Green in their assess-
ment of the therapeutic needs of gay youth. One professional asserts that
"[t]he psychosocial problems of gay and lesbian adolescents are primarily
the result of societal stigma, hostility, hatred, and isolation." 45 These
health professionals direct their therapeutic attention to helping gay youth
come to terms with their sexual orientation, rather than changing them
into heterosexuals. 146 For youth who have confusion about or are ques-
tioning their sexual orientation, counseling to help them through this pro-
cess is appropriate.
47
Given both societal ambivalence about homosexuality and the medi-
cal profession's changing views about homosexuality and GID, it is un-
derstandable that gay or questioning adolescents have difficulty reconcil-
ing the mixed messages they receive. Adolescence is a time when many
children struggle with sexual identity issues. 4 1 It is a time when some
children may first feel "different" from their "normal" heterosexual
peers.' 49 They may report feelings of homosexuality, bisexuality, trans-
genderism, or confusion about sexuality. 5° Many of these children face
severe harassment and ridicule at school or home which only exacerbates
their confusion."' Few schools, churches, communities, and families are
equipped to help them during this "coming out" process. Parents, fam-
ily, classmates, teachers, and counselors may be sources of support, but
are more often sources of conflict, if not harassment, belittlement, and/or
hostility. 152 Because of the lack of acceptance, gay adolescents are even
more susceptible than other adolescents to depression and behavioral or
144. Green, supra note 141, at 2014.
145. Beach, supra note 140, at 632 (citations omitted).
146. See id. at 633.
147. See id.
148. See Gary Remafedi et al., Demography of Sexual Orientation in Adolescents, 89
PEDIATRICs 714, 714-21 (1992). A study of 36,741 Minnesota public school students, grades 7
through 12 was conducted. 25.9% of 12-year-olds, compared to 5% of 18-year-olds described
themselves as "unsure" of their sexual orientation. Id. at 716. "Gay and lesbian adolescents
share many of the developmental tasks of their heterosexual peers. These include establishing a
sexual identity and deciding on sexual behaviors ... ." Beach, supra note 140, at 631.
149. "Developmental research suggests that most adults recognize their lesbian or gay sex-
ual orientation in early adolescence, although many do not label themselves or act upon their
feelings until later." D'Augelli & Hershberger, supra note 93, at 422 (citations omitted).
150. See id. (although no studies of transgenderism were located).
151. See id. at 423; see also supra note 94.
152. See id. at 423; see also Sonia Renee Martin, A Child's Right to Be Gay: Addressing
the Emotional Maltreatment of Queer Youth, 48 HASTINGS L. J. 167, 169-74 (1996).
August 1997]
emotional difficulties. 53 Alarmingly, the suicide rate for gay adolescents
is two to three times higher than for straight adolescents, and may ac-
count for up to 30% of completed youth suicides each year.
154
Alternatively, children struggling with these feelings and lack of ac-
ceptance may well engage in "acting out" behavior. This behavior could
result in a diagnosis of oppositional defiant disorder, or other behavior-
related disorders.15 5 However, there is no medical evidence that such ac-
tions or symptoms are caused by homosexuality, as opposed to a reaction
to hostile external forces.156
Some parents become desperate to find solutions to these concerns,
especially because they are particularly troubled by the fact that their
child is reporting what to them is an abnormal sexual orientation. When
faced with youth struggling with these issues, some parents choose to
civilly commit their children for inpatient psychiatric care. That care
may be sought in order to "cure" the homosexuality, to "cure" the "act-
ing out" or other behavior caused by the conflicts at home or school, or
to "cure" other symptoms like depression. While appropriate treatment
for suicidal behavior and severe depression may include inpatient treat-
ment, such treatment for other conditions should be viewed with great
skepticism in light of medical uncertainties surrounding homosexuality,
generally, and treatment for GID, 5 7 specifically. Stronger standards and
153. See D'Augelli & Hershberger, supra note 93, at 423-24. "Abusive treatment in
schools often results in declining academic performance, absenteeism, or dropping out for gay
and lesbian students. Internalized homophobia may act in concert with external abuse to
heighten the victim's sense of differentness, helplessness, guilt, and shame. Severe anxiety,
depression, and self-destructive acts may ensue." Gary Remafedi, Fundamental Issues in the
Care of Homosexual Youth, 74 MED. CLINICS N. AM. 1169, 1172 (1990).
154. See Gary Remafedi et al., Risk Factors for Attempted Suicide in Gay and Bisexual
Youth, 87 PEDIATRICS 869, 869 (1991) (quoting U. S. Dept. Health & Hum. Serv., Prevention
and Intervention in Youth Suicides, in 3 REP. OF THE SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE ON YOUTH
SUICIDE (1989)).
155. See infra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. "[N]umerous investigations involving
male homosexual adults have failed to reveal [that underlying characterologic and/or emotional
disorders may predispose homosexual and bisexual adolescents to psychosocial dysfunction]."
Gary Remafedi, Adolescent Homosexuality: Psychosocial and Medical Implications, 79
PEDIATRICS 331, 336 (1987).
157. It is clear that despite the controversy within the medical profession, treatment for
GID is still given. A recent article reported results of a survey of the ten most populous states
regarding the number of children or adults who were diagnosed with GID under the states'
Medicaid programs. Medicaid is a federal government health care program for indigent per-
sons. For Fiscal Year ("FY") 1995, New York reported that 66 children and 76 adults or ado-
lescents were diagnosed with GID. In FY 1996, 55 children and 73 adults or adolescents were
diagnosed. In Florida, in FY 1995, 2 children, and 1 adult or adolescent were diagnosed; in
FY 1996, 6 children, and 2 adults or adolescents were diagnosed. The results from other states
were not as certain. An Attack on Our Most Vulnerable: The Use and Abuse of Gender Identity
,Disorder, LESBIAN & GAY N.Y., Oct. 28, 1997, at 25.
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procedures are therefore necessary to ensure that the problems experi-
enced by the minor are accurately assessed and that medical treatment is
appropriate.
c. Vague diagnoses can be the basis for inpatient admissions
In addition to the lack of helpful admission criteria for juveniles,
some mental health diagnosis criteria for children are also quite vague
and overly broad. An example of this is the diagnosis of Oppositional
Defiant Disorder ("ODD"). 5 8 This diagnosis is one of a number of
"personality disorders" which are often used as a basis for admitting ju-
veniles for inpatient care.' 59 This diagnosis requires a "recurrent pattern
of negativistic, defiant, disobedient, and hostile behavior toward authority
figures that persists for at least six months."" 6 It is further
characterized by the frequent occurrence of at least four of the follow-
ing behaviors: losing temper, arguing with adults, actively defying or
refusing to comply with the requests or rules of adults, deliberately do-
ing things that will annoy other people, blaming others for his or her
own mistakes or misbehavior, being touchy or easily annoyed by others,
being angry and resentful, or being spiteful or vindictive.
Finally, to meet the diagnosis for ODD, "the behaviors must occur
more frequently than is typically observed in individuals of comparable
age and developmental level and must lead to significant impairment in
social, academic, or occupational functioning." 6 2 Weithom points out
that some researchers deem this behavior normal, as a part of growing
up, and some research suggests that in a large percentage of cases, the
presence of such behavior is transitory, So, while an ODD diagnosis
may meet the "mental disorder" standard required under Parham or
158. This was one of the diagnoses used to justify Lyn Duff's commitment. See infra notes
216-18 and accompanying text.
159. See Weithorn, supra note 121, at 789. This is borne out by data available in Califor-
nia. The California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development discharge data for
1990 and 1995 was analyzed. See infra note 222. In 1990, there were 9621 patients, 13 years
old or younger, who were admitted to a facility with a primary or secondary diagnosis with a
psychiatric basis. Of these 9621 cases, 983 had an ODD diagnosis. In 1990, there were 18,225
patients, 14 to 17 years old, who were admitted to a facility with a primary or secondary diag-
nosis with a psychiatric basis. Of these 18,225 cases, 1104 had an ODD diagnosis'. The data
for 1995 was 8165 cases, 13 or younger, 706 with an ODD diagnosis, and 19,655 patients, 14
to 17, 1075 with an ODD diagnosis. ODD was the sixth most frequent psychiatric diagnosis in
1990, and the eighth most frequent in 1995. See infra note 222.
160. DSM-IV at 91.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See Weithorn, supra note 121, at 790-91.
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Roger S., it does not constitute the severe or acute mental illness standard
required for adult, juvenile ward or dependent inpatient admissions.' 6'
Because of rejection or abuse, gay or questioning youth may well
engage in behavior which could be characterized as meeting an ODD di-
agnosis. For example, many gay youth run away from home or have
conflicts with the law."es These behaviors could meet the pattern of
negativistic, defiant, disobedient, and hostile behavior toward authority
figures specified in the ODD diagnosis. However, that does not mean
that inpatient commitment is necessarily an appropriate response.
A similar analysis follows if a minor is diagnosed with depression.
In reviewing the symptoms of "Major Depressive Episode" in the DSM,
it is conceivable that many adolescents, especially those facing rejection
and belittlement because of their homosexuality, could be diagnosed as
meeting its criteria." Among minors in California, the most frequently
made diagnoses supporting inpatient admissions are based on depression
or related diagnoses.167 Depression is a frequently occurring symptom of
gay children, 6 ' and many could be diagnosed as meeting the DSM defi-
nition of a major depressive episode. As such, they could be admitted
for inpatient care on the basis of such a diagnosis. As with the ODD di-
agnosis, however, inpatient treatment is not necessarily an appropriate
option. Without stronger protections, however, improper inpatient ad-
missions will continue to occur.
164. See supra notes 6-25 and accompanying text.
165. See Remafedi, supra note 156, at 336.
166. The essential feature of a Major Depressive Episode is a period of at least two weeks
during which there is either a depressed mood or a loss of interest or pleasure in nearly all ac-
tivities. In children and adolescents, the mood may be irritable rather than sad. The individual
must also experience at least four additional symptoms drawn from a list that includes changes
in appetite or weight, sleep and psychomotor activity; decreased energy; feelings of worthless-
ness or guilt; difficulty thinking, concentrating, or making decisions; or recurrent thoughts of
death or suicidal ideation, plans, or attempts. To count toward a Major Depressive Episode, a
symptom must either be newly present or must have clearly worsened compared with the per-
son's preepisode status. The symptoms must persist for most of the day, nearly every day, for
at least two consecutive weeks. See DSM-IV at 320.
167. For example, the California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development
data for 1995 showed that the most frequent diagnoses for inpatient admissions for 14-17 year
olds, based on a psychiatric diagnosis, were depressive disorder (3069), major depressive disor-
der (2083), major depressive disorder, severe (1687), neurotic depression (1490), and major
depressive disorder, recurrent, severe (1161). These diagnoses represented five of the top eight
diagnoses. The numbers in parentheses represent the number of occurrences of the diagnosis
among 19,655 total admissions. Multiple diagnoses were not eliminated, so that the numbers
do not represent the number of individuals admitted for a specified diagnosis. The data for
1990 is similar. See infra note 222.
168. See supra notes 153, 154.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Voi.48
UNLOCKING THE CLOSET DOOR
(2) Assumption that Parents Will Act in Best Interests of Children
Both Parham and Roger S. assumed that parents will act in the best
interests of their children out of love and affection. "[II]istorically, [the
law] has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in
the best interest of their children." 169  "We emphasize here our assump-
tion that the great majority of parents are well motivated and act in what
they reasonably perceive to be the best interest of their children."1 70
Therefore, parental decisions and the right of parents to make decisions
affecting their children receive great deference from the courts.
Critics of the view that parents will act in the best interests of their
children cite the realities of the family situations which are typical when a
commitment decision is being contemplated. Parents are at their wit's
end, and are, in essence, prepared to abdicate their parental authority to
the state. 
71
Because parents rarely are mental health professionals and also be-
cause their concerns must include the well-being of the family as a
whole rather than solely the child, commitment decisions often are
made based upon a misunderstanding of the child's behaviors and/or a
desire to do what is best for the family. Parents' perceptions also may
be distorted. Parents may use the child as the family scapegoat, blam-
ing all family problems on the child's behavior. The family itself may
be dysfunctional, with many children facing commitment coming from
dysfunctional families. A disturbed family system may be partly re-
sponsible for the child's bizarre behaviors which, in turn, causes the
parent to misinterpret the child's behaviors and needs. Often, a child's
problems cannot be meaningfully separated from those of the family.
The child's behavior may reflect adaptation to a home environment
which does not provide for him or her adequately.172
A corollary of the assumption that parents act in the best interests of
their children is that harm to the parent-child relationship will occur if the
court interferes with parental decisions.
Another problem with requiring a formalized, factfinding hearing lies in
the danger it poses for significant intrusion into the parent-child rela-
tionship. Pitting the parents and child as adversaries often will be at
odds with the presumption that parents act in the best interests of their
169. Parham v. J.R, 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (citations omitted).
170. In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 1295 (Cal. 1977).
171. See Garvey, supra note 116, at 810-11 (persuasively arguing that the distinctions made
between liberty interests of adults and children are unwarranted, and that, therefore, the same
procedural due process protections ought to attach for children and adults facing civil commit-
ment).
172. DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS FOR JUVENILES IN CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS 5-
6 (Richard E. Redding et al. eds., 1991). See also Ellis, supra note 116, at 857-62; Shoenber-
ger, supra note 116, at 7 n.39.
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child.... Surely, there is a risk that it would exacerbate whatever ten-
sions already exist between the child and the parents.
173
The Roger S. opinion had the opposite perspective on this potential
problem, finding that "such recognition of the child's right to due process
in proceedings to admit him to a state mental hospital [would not] neces-
sarily weaken the family unit. The contrary may be true."1 74
These intrafamilial dynamics are of particular concern for gay
youth. When parents first learn that their children are gay, they are often
emotionally devastated, feel great shame or anger and feel great isola-
tion-feelings which parallel those experienced by their children.175 Gay
children report that they do not feel comfortable revealing their sexual
orientation to their parents because they fear punishment, rejection or
being disowned by their parents or families.176 Parents may seek com-
mitment to change a child's sexual orientation even if there is no recog-
nized and appropriate mental "disorder." Such a decision may stem from
parental fear, disapproval, anger or shame, rather than the child's best
interests.
173. Parhram, 442 U.S. at 610.
174. Roger S., 569 P.2d at 1291 (citing Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 (1976), for the proposition that when a minor seeks an abortion, the parent and minor
are fundamentally in conflict).
175.
It is an exceptional parent who can provide appropriate support and guidance for gay
children without assistance. Most parents need information about homosexuality.
The myth that blames parents for a child's homosexuality should be directly. con-
fronted and replaced by more reliable information. Most parents need to grieve the
loss of their child's heterosexual identity and the anticipated loss of their own identity
as grandparents, before they can accept their son's or daughter's homosexuality.
Remafedi, supra note 153, at 1175-76.
176.
(A]vailable anecdotal and empirical reports underscore substantial challenges to ad-
justment for lesbian, gay, and bisexual youth. In general, openness to others about
sexual orientation is associated with better psychological adjustment, although there
are risks associated with such disclosures. The process of disclosure or coming-out is
generally an emotionally difficult one, but it is worsened by negative reactions from
significant others such as family and friends, and by discrimination, harassment and
violence directed to lesbians, gay males, and bisexual people. For lesbian, gay, or bi-
sexual adolescents, risks of rejection from peers and from family members are par-
ticularly important. Remafedi found that 41% of his gay male sample had lost at least
one friend because of sexual orientation. In addition, only 21% of mothers and 10%
of fathers who were told of their sons' sexual orientation were perceived to be sup-
portive. In a university sample of gay males, D'Augelli found that 26% of mothers
and 57% of fathers were seen as intolerant or rejecting after their offsprings' disclo-
sure of their sexual orientation. Verbal harassment of open young lesbians, gay
males, and bisexuals occurs frequently; physical assault also occurs, especially in ur-
ban areas.
D'Augelli & Hershberger, supra note 93, at 423 (citations omitted).
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It is true that most parents act in their children's best interests in
making health treatment decisions on their behalf. Nevertheless, both
Parham and Roger S. failed to recognize that when parents face the deci-
sion to commit their children, their judgment may be clouded by extreme
emotional and intrafamilial circumstances, especially when parents are
coming to terms with their children's differing sexual orientation or low
conformity to gender norms.
(3) Assumption that Physician Will Act in Best Interests of Children
Parham assumed that physicians will act in the best interests of chil-
dren. "We are satisfied that the voluminous record as a whole supports
the conclusion that the admissions staffs of the hospitals have acted in a
neutral and detached fashion in making medical judgments in the best in-
terests of the children." 1" Roger S., on the other hand, noted that in the
case before it, several physicians and a psychologist had reached "dia-
metrically opposed views [in] ... precommitment and postadmission
evaluation[s]."178 Thus, while not addressing the issue of physician bias,
Roger S. did express concern about the potential for erroneous diagnosis.
Along similar lines, some commentators believe that physicians may
act on behalf of parents as opposed to children.179 After all, the parents
are usually the person with whom the physician has the most contact and
it is the parents who seek advice and relief from the demands of their
children and who may directly or indirectly foot the bill for the treatment.
For gay youth in particular, the issue of whether the therapist is
acting in their or their parents' interests is a very real one. One of the
justifications for treatment of GiID in children is to address "appropriate
parental concern over gender deviance."18 This is a questionable justifi-
cation, given that treatment should be aimed at the needs of the "sick"
person, not at those of his or her parents.
The issue of physician bias was also raised in American Academy of
Pediatrics. The State contended, in supporting the constitutionality of the
177. Parham, 442 U.S. at 616.
178. Roger S., 569 P.2d at 1295.
179.
When a parent seeking to have a child committed goes to a hospital official or a pri-
vate psychiatrist, however, the psychiatrist's position becomes less clear-cut. In the
case of a juvenile voluntary patient, the legal volition involved is that of the parent.
While the goal of the psychiatrist will be expressed-and perceived-as the best wel-
fare of the child-patient, it is the parent who has come to seek help, whose situation
seems most desperate, who seems the most reliable source of information about what
is wrong, who is closest to the psychiatrist in age and social outlook, and who is pay-
ing the psychiatrist's fee.
Ellis, supra note 116, at 867-68.
180. See Rekers, supra note 134.
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statute at issue, that the judicial bypass was justified by the State's inter-
est in ensuring that the determination whether a minor is competent and
mature enough to consent to an abortion is made in a fair and unbiased
manner."' The plurality disagreed and found that "[n]othing in the rec-
ord justifies an assumption that licensed health care providers cannot be
trusted to make an unbiased determination as to whether a minor is capa-
ble of giving informed consent to an abortion .... ,,"2 In arguments
which echo those made by critics of Parham, Justice Mosk pointed out in
his dissent that
In any individual case, factors beyond mere medical judgment may
weigh in favor of, or against, an abortion. A parent may offer a more
complete and accurate perspective on those factors than a physician; so
also might a neutral juvenile court judge in a bypass procedure. Fur-
ther, unlike a parent acting in the unemancipated minor's overall best
interest or a neutral judge, a physician may have a "direct, personal,
substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion," or a personal
bias in favor of-or against-abortion. 83
Thus, both the plurality and Justice Mosk were cognizant of the is-
sue, and recognized the need to examine whether a physician can exer-
cise decision-making power without undue bias. The plurality was con-
vinced that in the abortion context there was no evidence that such bias
existed. Nevertheless, Roger S. found the possibility of physician bias to
be a very real one in the commitment context.
As noted by Justice Mosk, physician bias may take the form of fi-
nancial self-interest. In the 1980s, there was evidence that some health
care providers had financial motives for the treatment recommendations
they made. There are convincing facts which show growing populations
of children are being "treated" in inpatient settings, thus raising the con-
cern that the recommendations to commit these children were not made
with the interests of the children in mind.' 84 Over the last sixty years,
there has been a steep increase in the admission rates of minors as well as
a significant shift from public to private placements."8 5 For instance,
between 1980 and 1984 national juvenile admissions to private psychiatric
hospitals increased more than fourfold."8 6 There was also a parallel in-
crease in the number of private psychiatric hospitals around the same
181. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 860 (Cal. 1997) (Mosk,
J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 830.
183. Id. at 860 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
184. See Weithorn, supra note 121, at 783.
185. See id. (citing Emerging Trends in Mental Health Care for Adolescents: Hearings
Before the House Select Comm. on Children, Youth, and Families, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1985)).
186. See id. This statistic was not adjusted to account for population change, but the
population of persons under 18 decreased 1.6% from 1980-84.
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time."17 Free-standing facilities increased 35% from 1985 to 1987 and
psychiatric wards in general hospitals increased 49 %. 188
The combination of the facts that psychiatric hospitals are relatively
inexpensive to operate (because relatively small numbers of psychiatrists
can oversee the treatment of large numbers of patients); the fact that
many health insurance policies will pay large reimbursement rates for in-
patient psychiatric care, even on a short-term basis; and that many health
insurance policies limit coverage for outpatient psychiatric care, all com-
bine to favor the economics of inpatient psychiatric care. 8 9
Indications are that these trends are reversing somewhat in the
1990s."9 The combination of highly publicized scandals in the mental
health care industry, 9 ' governmental investigations,"
9 media coverage, 193
and a substantial move toward managed care"9 has resulted in dramatic
decreases in the provision of mental health services. Nevertheless, large
numbers of children continue to be admitted for inpatient psychiatric
care, 195 some number of whom are undoubtedly admitted because of their
sexual orientation or low conformity to gender norms.
The issue of physician bias is particularly relevant for gay youth.
While homosexuality has been declassified as a mental disorder by the
187. See id. at 816-17.
188. See id. at 816-17.
189. See id. at 816-17.
190. See Mark Smith, Mental Health Managed Care Brings Concerns: Financial Limits
Blamedfor Shorter In-Patient Stays, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 23, 1997, at Al.
191.
In a major case, California-based National Medical Enterprises paid a record $379
million in fines, penalties and civil damages on behalf of its psychiatric hospital sub-
sidiary .... The NME subsidiary pleaded guilty to a kickback scheme in which
physicians and others were paid to refer patients to its psychiatric hospitals.
Id.
192. See "The Profits of Misery: How Inpatient Psychiatric Treatment Bilks the System and
Betrays Our Trust," Hearings before the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families,
102nd Congress, Second Session, 138 Cong. Rec. D456-01 (1992); Peter Kerr, U. S. Study of
Mental Care Finds Widespread Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1992, at Dl (reporting that "[a]
Federal Government review of private psychiatric hospital cases-most of them teen-agers and
young children of military families-has found that in 64 percent of the cases patients never
should have been admitted, were kept longer than necessary or had medical records for which
their hospitals could not justify treatment."); UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
JUVENILE JUSTICE - ADMISSIONS OF MINORS WITH PREADULT DISORDERS TO PRIVATE
PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS, GAO/GGD 94-167FS (1994).
193. See JOE SHARKEY, BEDLAM: GREED, PROFITEERING, AND FRAUD IN A MENTAL
HEALTH SYSTEM GONE CRAZY (1994).
194. "Without question, managed care has led to quantifiable changes in mental health care.
The average private hospital stay for psychiatric treatment, for example, has dropped from 26
days nationwide in 1990 to less than 10 days now." Smith, supra note 190, at Al.
195. For example, data in California shows large numbers of minors being admitted for
inpatient care based on psychiatric diagnoses. See supra note 159.
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American Psychiatric Association, 1" some therapists continue to believe
that homosexuality is a mental disorder and continue to offer reparative
therapy as a way to prevent homosexuality." 9 The efficacy of reparative
therapy has recently been questioned by the American Psychological As-
sociation."' As noted above, these controversies are reflective of a more
generalized societal ambivalence about homosexuality.' 99 As such, there
is a high degree of probability, in the context of commitments involving a
gay minor, that "licensed health care providers cannot be trusted to make
an unbiased determination" as to the minor's best interests.
(4) Assumption that Benefits of Inpatient Care Outweigh Harms
Parham and Roger S. seemed to acknowledge the trauma and loss of
freedom that result from inpatient commitment. Parham acknowledged
that "a child.., has a substantial liberty interest in not being confined
unnecessarily for medical treatment."' Roger S. acknowledged that
"[t]he consequences of confining a person, minor or adult, involuntarily
in a mental hospital are quite different and impinge much more directly
on the liberty interest of the patient than does confinement for treatment
of physical illness.""° However, Parham and Roger S. failed to ac-
knowledge that less drastic forms of treatment might better serve the af-
196. See supra text accompanying note 124.
197.
Every day young men seek help because they are experiencing an unwanted sexual at-
traction to other men, and are told that their condition is untreatable. It is not sur-
prising that many of these young men fall into depression or despair when they are in-
formed that a normal life with a wife and children is never to be theirs .... Young
men and the parents of at-risk males have a right to know that prevention and effec-
tive treatment are available.
Charles Socarides et al., Don't Forsake Homosexuals Who Want Help, WALL ST. J, Jan. 9,
1997, at A12. See also supra notes 138-39.
198. See David Tuller, Psychologists Oppose "Conversion" Therapy for Gays, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 15, 1997, at A3 (reporting that "Itihe American Psychological Association voted
yesterday to discourage controversial therapies that seek to change a person's sexual orienta-
tion."). In a carefully worded resolution, the American Psychological Association Council of
Representatives recognized that gay, lesbian, bisexual, and questioning individuals are "at risk
for presenting for 'conversion' treatment [treatment to change sexual orientation] due to family
or social coercion and/or lack of information." American Psychological Association Council of
Representatives, Resolution on Appropriate Therapeutic Responses to Sexual Orientation (vis-
ited Feb. 20, 1998) <http://psychology.ucdavis.edu/rainbow/htmllresolution97_text.html>.
The resolution goes on to state that "psychologists [should] not make false or deceptive state-
ments concerning... the scientific or clinical basis for ... their services" and that "psycholo-
gists [should] attempt to identify situations in which particular interventions... may not be
applicable.., because of factors such as ... sexual orientation." Id.
199. See supra Part II.A.
200. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979).
201. Roger S., 569 P.2d at 1290.
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fected children. Studies have shown that cure rates in inpatient settings
are quite low, and that treatment in community-based settings may obtain
better results.2ca This, combined with the generally restrictive settings,
indicates that for most patients inpatient care is the least desirable form of
treatment.
In addition, the stigma of hospitalization in mental institutions still
exists. Parham understood the weight of this stigma:
We... recognize that commitment sometimes produces adverse social
consequences for the child because of the reaction of some to the dis-
covery that the child has received psychiatric care.... This reaction,
however, need not be equated with the community response resulting
from being labeled by the state as delinquent, criminal, or mentally ill
and possibly dangerous. The state through its voluntary commitment
procedures does not "label" the child; it provides a diagnosis and treat-
ment that medical specialists conclude the child requires. In terms of
public reaction, the child who exhibits abnormal behavior may be seri-
ously injured by an erroneous decision not to commit. Appellees over-
look a significant source of the public reaction to the mentally ill, for
what is truly "stigmatizing" is the symptomatology of a mental or emo-
tional illness.un
In contrast, Roger S. recognized the child's interest in avoiding the
stigma, "[n]ot only is there physical restraint, but there is injury to pro-
tected interests in reputation, an interest in not being improperly or un-
fairly stigmatized as mentally ill or disordered."'4
In addition, there are demonstrable long-term negative effects from
prolonged inpatient treatment in terms of transitional and readjustment
difficulties, not to mention the trauma of the treatment itself.s Further,
attempts to "cure" sexual orientation may do more harm than good.'
Moreover, there are other demonstrable consequences of inpatient treat-
ment such as lost educational opportunities, inability to socialize in non-
institutional settings, and the loss of potential career opportunities.' De-
202. "Despite the fact that it is the most costly and restrictive type of mental health treat-
ment, '... . the effectiveness of psychiatric hospitalization for treating childhood mental disor-
ders has not been systematically studied.'" Ira M. Schwartz, Hospitalization of Adolescents for
Psychiatric and Substance Abuse Treatment, 10 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 473, 474
(1989). "Early empirical findings suggest that certain family-oriented and community-based
programs are quite successful at alleviating a range of serious or disturbing child, adolescent,
and family problems." Weithorn, supra note 121, at 788.
203. Parham, 442 U.S. at 600-01 (citations omitted).
204. Roger S., 569 P.2d at 1291-92 (citations omitted).
205. See Weithorn, supra note 121, at 796-97.
206. See supra note 198. "Therapy directed specifically at changing sexual orientation is
contraindicated, since it can provoke guilt and anxiety while having little or no potential for
achieving changes in orientation." Beach, supra note 140, at 633.
207. See Weithorn, supra note 121, at 796-97.
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spite these concerns, however, the courts left it to medical personnel to
make and review the commitment decision.
(5) Assumption that Parents Have Better Capacity than Children for Good
Decision Making
Children have a greater capacity to make good decisions for them-
selves than the law accepts. In Roger S., the court stated that "14 years
is the appropriate age at which [children's right to assert their right to due
process independently when opposed to a parental decision to institution-
alize] must be recognized."" 8 On the other hand, Parham found that
the law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents pos-
sess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for
judgment required for making life's difficult decisions.... Most
children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judg-
ments concerning many decisions, including their need for medical care
or treatment. °
Critics of this assumption have pointed to the abortion cases in
which minors' right to choose an abortion cannot be unreasonably con-
strained.10 Studies have also demonstrated that minors are capable of
making sound decisions on their own behalf. 2 1 Children who are demon-
strably able to make good decisions for themselves should be able to do
SO.
The assumption that parents are in a better position to "choose" the
appropriate medical treatment than their children is especially suspect
where a child is struggling with options that may be totally foreign to the
parents, and where the biological or psychological considerations may be
outside the experiences of the parents. Parents are undoubtedly strug-
gling with their children's sexual orientation. This could result in deci-
sion-making which is clouded by unfounded fears or biases, rather than
what is in the minor's best interests.
D. Case Studies
There is some anecdotal information about cases involving institu-
tionalization of children because of their sexual orientation.21 2 Compre-
208. Roger S., 569 P.2d at 1297.
209. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602-03.
210. See Butler, supra note 116, at 1285.
211. See, e.g., Lois A. Weithom, Children's Capacities in Legal Contexts, in CHILDREN,
MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAw 25-55 (N. Dickson Reppucci et al. eds., 1987)(citing studies);
see also GARY B. MELTON ET AL., CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT (1983).
212. See supra references in note 2; see generally PHYLLIS BURKE, GENDER SHOCK (1996)
(reporting on an 11-year-old girl who was hospitalized for depression and GID); Bruce Mirken,
Setting Them Straight, 10 PERCENT, June 1994, at 54 (the story of a 14-year-old who spent 45
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hensive data has not been found, and there appear to be no studies to de-
termine the pervasiveness of this problem.213
A couple of examples are telling. Daphne Scholinski survived an
ordeal lasting four years in an institution. Since then she has spent many
years trying to recover from the horrors she suffered there. She relates
these horrors elsewhere in this issue.214 One of the reasons she was
committed was that she did not act like a "sexual female. "21 As a result,
she was labeled as having a sexual identity problem, and was institution-
alized for treatment of this "problem."
In 1991, a fifteen year old named Lyn Duff was diagnosed with
ODD, Sexual Identity Disorder, and GID.216 Though residing in Califor-
nia, Lyn was admitted to a facility called Rivendell in Utah where she
was forcibly taken by her mother through the use of an "escort" serv-
ice.2"7 Rivendell advertised that it could "help kids work out their prob-
lems."
218
While at Rivendell she underwent various forms of behavior modifi-
cation. She was locked in seclusion rooms, was administered drugs, and
days at Rivendell after his parents caught him having sex with a boy. His treatment included
having electrodes attached to his penis and receiving electric shocks if he became aroused by
pictures of men.); Bob Gardinier, Four Winds Pickets Claim Mistreatment of Youths, Gays,
TIMES UNION (Albany), June 4, 1996, at B10 (reporting on alleged use of aversion therapy to
"treat" gay and lesbian youth); Mark Smith, Profitable Addictions; Marketing Ploys or Medical
Need?; Wealth of new programs raises questions, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 8, 1991, at 1 (ex-
amining marketing by private psychiatric hospitals in Texas which includes treatment for sexual
disorders; also relating testimony by a young man before a Texas State Senate committee who
had been hospitalized for two-and-a-half years because his mother did not want to deal with his
gayness. He also testified that there were at least ten other minors there who were also institu-
tionalized because they were gay.); Natalie Angier, The Biology of What it Means to be Gay,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1991, at 4-1 (describing a social service agency's experience with a 12-
year-old boy who was sent to a psychiatric hospital by his mother when he told her he was gay);
Two TEENAGERS IN TWENTY: WRITINGS BY GAY AND LESBIAN YOUTH 51 (Ann Heron ed.,
1984) (writings by teenagers including several who had spent time in lock-up facilities and psy-
chiatric hospitals).
213. See supra note 2.
214. Daphne Scholinski, After-Wards, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1195 (1997). Ms. Scholinski has
recently published a book detailing her experiences. DAPHNE SCHOLINSKI WITH JANE
MEREDITH ADAMS, THE LAST TIME I WORE A DRESS (1997).
215. See Scholinski, After-Wards, supra note 214, at 1195.
216. See Lyn Duff, I Was a Teenage Test Case, 16 CAL. J. 5, 46 (1996); Elizabeth Fer-
nandez, Girl "divorces" mom for gay guardians, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 22, 1993, at Al;
BURKE, supra note 212, at 93-95.
217. See Duff, supra note 216, at 46.
218. See, e.g., Rivendell Advertisement, SUNSET, Nov. 1991, at 255. Copies of advertise-
ments for Rivendell appearing in Sunset magazine in 1991 on file with Hastings Law Journal.
Advertisements in 1997 for Rivendell and its uccessor, Copper Hills Youth Center, state that it
treats "sexual impulse disorders."
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participated in group sessions with other girls where they discussed
dresses and makeup.1 This lasted for 178 days.'
Daphne and Lyn survived their ordeals, however both of them
strongly believe that their institutionalization was wrong, actively harmed
them, and that what happened to them should not happen to others.
E. Need for Additional Data
It would be useful if data about LPS, Roger S. and S.B. 595 com-
mitments could be compared. Unfortunately, LPS and Roger S. data is
not required to be collected, and the data is not maintained by either the
State of California Department of Mental Health ("DMH") or Patients'
Rights Advocates, so no studies analyzing the different procedures are
available. 1
In the absence of such reporting requirements, I have attempted to
collect raw data for analysis. First, I obtained discharge data. The State
of California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development
("OSHPD") collects data reported by both public and private hospitals
throughout the state.' The data includes information about all inpatient
admissions, including the nature of the primary and secondary admitting
diagnoses. Unfortunately, this data does not indicate the reason for dis-
charge (e.g., whether the patient requested a review and was subse-
quently released through the review process or whether the patient was
released after treatment).
In 1991, the California Association of Mental Health Patients'
Rights Advocates ("CAMPHRA") submitted statistics in support of pro-
posed post-Roger S. legislation which indicated that in 1990 the release
rate as a result of Roger S. due process procedures in the public system
was one release per 15 admissions.' CAMPHRA indicated that the re-
lease rate as a result of the clinical review in the private system was one
release per 290 admissions in 1990. The source of the data could not be
219. See Duff, supra note 216, at 46.
220. See id.
221. An extensive review of the legal and medical literature uncovered no studies of data
analyzing commitment of children for inpatient care.
222. Under California Health and Safety Code § 443.31(g) (1990) (repealed 1995), each
county and private facility had to provide annual patient discharge data. State hospitals are not
required to report. Disks containing data for 1990 and 1995 were obtained from OSHPD and
are on file with the author.
223. Assembly Comm. on Health, A.B. 1276 (Apr. 23, 1991).
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confirmed. 4  Nevertheless, there was evidence that compliance with
S.B. 595 was very sporadic and resulted in low release rates in 1990.'
Private facilities are required to provide information including the
"number of minors admitted by diagnosis, length of stay, and source of
payment, the number of requests for an independent clinical review by
diagnosis, source of payment, and outcome of the independent clinical
review" to DMH on an annual basis.' I obtained all available data from
DMH. 7 The data was incomplete.' Data for 1995 was the most com-
plete with eleven facilities reporting.229 Among these eleven facilities, a
total of 2127 patients between fourteen and seventeen years old were re-
ported admitted. Of these patients, 151 (7% of total admissions) re-
quested an independent clinical review (one review was apparently re-
quested by MediCal). Of these 151 patients, 82 (54% of those requesting
review) subsequently rescinded their request for review; 34 (22%) were
released before the review occurred; 7 (4.6%) were released after the re-
view; and 28 (18.4%) were detained after review.
While it is difficult to draw final conclusions from this limited data,
inasmuch as 59% of the reviews conducted resulted in releases, it
strongly suggests that the review process prevents inappropriate commit-
ments." It also raises disturbing questions about waivers and pressures
exerted on minors, since 93 % of the patients did not request reviews, and
54% of those requesting reviews withdrew their requests prior to the re-
views.
224. CAMPHRA was contacted, but they were unable to provide the raw data on which
these figures were based.
225. See Marc N. Sperber, Short-Sheeting the Psychiatric Bed: State-Level Strategies to
Curtail the Unnecessary Hospitalization of Adolescents in For-Profit Mental Health Facilities,
13 AM. J.L. & MED. 251, 263-67 (1992) (detailing post-S.B. 595 compliance, and reporting
low release rates ranging from three releases in 47 reviews, to two releases in 113 reviews).
226. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6002.40(c) (West, WESTLAW through 1997 portion of
1997-98 Reg. Sess. and 1st Ex. Sess.).
227. DMH is charged with the collection of and monitoring the compliance with the re-
porting requirement contained in California Welfare and Institutions Code § 6002.40(c) (West,
WESTLAW through 1997 portion of 1997-98 Reg. Sess. and 1st Ex. Sess.). We were invited
to review available reports at the offices of DMH in Sacramento.
228. A total of 13 reports were available and were photocopied.
229. According to the OSHPD discharge data, in 1990 there were 450 and in 1995 there
were 418 facilities which admitted inpatient care patients 14-17 years old with a primary or sec-
ondary psychological diagnosis. This data does not include data from state hospitals, but does
include data from county hospitals which are not subject to S.B. 595.
230. See also infra notes 242-49 and accompanying text describing similar results in the




Gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, and questioning youth may be
at higher risk of commitment than straight youth because sexuality is-
sues will cause some parents and health practitioners to take drastic
steps to get them "treated." The legal procedures I've described to you
concern me because they don't adequately protect gay youth from po-
tentially harmful hospitalization. This is particularly true for private
hospitals. I hope that advocates will try to implement procedures which
will require a meaningful process to consider what children need in or-
der to get better and to prevent unnecessary and harmful "treatment." I
also hope that they help develop alternative treatment placements so
that gay youth who are having problems can obtain appropriate serv-
ices.
I will now set forth six proposals which accomplish three different
goals with the overall purpose of preventing improper inpatient psychiat-
ric admissions of gay youth. The first goal is to strengthen the due proc-
ess protections for gay youth. The first, third, fourth and fifth proposals
address various aspects of current procedures, and suggest changes to
better protect the interests of gay youth. The second goal is to expand
the universe of possibilities for gay youth who interact with the mental
health system. The second proposal suggests that the development of
treatment alternatives is a way to accomplish this goal. Finally, the third
goal is to increase the knowledge base so that future decisions can be
made with the benefit of relevant and important data. The sixth proposal
suggests avenues for additional data-gathering.
A. Standard of Review Encompassing LPS and "Least Restrictive
Alternative" Standards
As previously discussed, different standards of review apply for ju-
veniles facing commitment, depending on who is seeking to commit
them, and whether the facility is public or private. For all adults, and for
children who are wards of the state who object to commitment, the State
has the burden to show that they are gravely disabled or that they pose a
substantial risk of injury to themselves or others in order for the com-
mitment order to be upheld."31 For children facing commitment in a pub-
lic hospital because of their parents' decision, Roger S. held that the pur-
pose of the review process is to determine whether "the minor is mentally
ill or disordered, and whether, if the minor is not gravely disabled or
dangerous to himself or others as a result of mental illness or disorder,
231. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5256.5 (West 1984). However, only a showing of
probable cause is necessary to justify a 72 hour commitment. See § 5150.
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the admission sought is likely to benefit him." 2 Finally, the standard of
review for juveniles whose parents seek placement in a private inpatient
setting is
whether the minor continues to have a mental disorder, whether further
inpatient treatment is reasonably likely to be beneficial to the minor's
mental disorder, or whether the placement in the facility represents the
least restrictive, most appropriate available setting, within the con-
straints of reasonably available services, facilities, resources, and finan-
cial support, in which to treat the minor.
233
For gay youth, the lower standards of review applied in Roger S.
and S.B. 595 proceedings make it much more likely that their commit-
ment orders will be upheld when commitment is sought by their parents.
This could happen in a number of ways. For example, since GID is listed
as a mental disorder in the DSM, parents could seek to admit their child
based on a GID diagnosis. Another likely scenario for gay youth in-
volves a child's failure to cooperate with treatment to modify sexual ori-
entation. If the child acts defiantly, a parent could seek to have him or
her admitted using an ODD diagnosis. For Roger S. admissions, a phy-
sician need only make the GID or ODD diagnosis and assert that the in-
patient placement is likely to benefit the child. Similarly, for private
placements, all that is needed is a GID or ODD diagnosis and an asser-
tion that "further inpatient treatment is reasonably likely to be benefi-cial ..... ",a
Inappropriate commitments of gay youth could easily be prevented if
the LPS "gravely disabled or substantial risk of injury" combined with
the "least restrictive alternative" standard were imposed in both Roger S.
and S.B. 595 reviews. The LPS standard requires a significant showing
of illness before inpatient treatment is permitted. The "least restrictive
alternative" standard requires that there are no less-restrictive alternatives
to inpatient care."
232. In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 1289 (Cal. 1977).
233. CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE § 6002.30(c) (West, WESTLAW through 1997 portion of
1997-98 Reg. Sess. and 1st Ex. Sess.).
234. Id.
235. While Roger S. suggested that the "least restrictive alternative" standard might apply,
the opinion never clearly articulated that this standard applied in the case. Instead, the opinion
only noted that "the [U.S.] Supreme Court has suggested that a court may have a duty to ex-
plore possible alternatives to the involuntary commitment of a juvenile . . . ." 569 P.2d at
1292. Since Roger S. legislation has never been adopted, only counties which use LPS proce-
dures as their means of enforcing Roger S. are likely to use the "least restrictive alternative"
standard. It is unclear how likely this is given that the "least restrictive alternative" standard
only applies when a conservator is appointed under California Welfare and Institutions Code §
5350 (West 1984).
For private placements, despite the presence of "least restrictive alternative" language in
the California Welfare and Institutions Code § 6002.30(c) (West, WESTLAW through 1997
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Potential inpatient admissions of gay minors based on GID, ODD or
depression are troubling. Given the controversial nature of the diagnosis
and treatment of GID, 26 commitment based solely upon a diagnosis of
GID should not be permitted .1 7 Even among those practitioners who be-
lieve that GID is treatable, the preferred treatment options are therapy or
behavior modification, generally on an outpatient basis. 238 While inpa-
tient treatment is mentioned as a treatment option for GID in adolescents,
it is thought to be an unrealistic option." Similarly, ODD or other
similar diagnoses are quite controversial. 2' Such diagnoses can easily be
used to "label" gay minors as mentally ill without assessing whether there
is a serious illness for which inpatient care is necessary.241 The diagnosis
of depression can be manipulated in a similar manner. While some gay
minors suffer from depression, and need treatment, inpatient care is not
necessarily the best way to treat it.
portion of 1997-98 Reg. Sess. and 1st Ex. Sess.), its usefulness is suspect. First, the statute
uses "or," not "and," in its delineation of review criteria, providing alternative rather than cu-
mulative standards. Arguably, the reviewing psychiatrist could make sufficient findings to sup-
port inpatient care if he finds that the minor continues to have a mental disorder even if inpa-
tient care is not the least restrictive alternative. Second, the statute couples the "least restrictive
alternative" with "availability." Thus, if no other alternatives exist, inpatient care can be
deemed appropriate.
236. See supra notes 134-47 and accompanying text.
237. The literature suggests that GID is rare. See Beach, supra note 140, at 631. This
seems to be born out in the OSHPD and S.B. 595 data. The OSHIPD data for 14-17 year olds
showed that nine children in 1990 and eight children in 1995 were admitted to inpatient care
with a primary or secondary diagnosis of GID. GID is not an available diagnosis for children
13 years old and under, so it is difficult to determine whether there are any admissions because
of GID or similar diagnoses. For the S.B. 595 data for 1995, only 1 of 2127 diagnoses was for
a sexual disorder.
238. See supra notes 138, 139, 146, 147.
239.
In those cases in which a complete reversal of cross-gender behaviors and fantasies
has apparently occurred, that reversal has been achieved by means of intensive (usu-
ally residential) long-term treatment employing behavior modification and insight-
oriented psychotherapy (cites omitted)... However, given changes in sensibility re-
garding treatment choice, adolescents with gender identity disorder who are competent
enough to make these decisions are unlikely to accept residential treatment for their
condition. In fact, there have been no reports of such treatment over the last 10
years.
KENNETH J. ZUCKER & SUSAN J. BRADLEY, GENDER IDENTITY DISORDER AND
PSYCHOSEXUAL PROBLEMS IN CHILDREN AND ADULTS 316 (1995). This quote contradicts the
anecdotal stories related supra note 212. See also Robert J. Kosky, Gender-Disordered Chil-
dren: Does Inpatient Treatment Help?, 146 MED. J. AUSTL. 565, 565-69 (1987) (reporting
'good" short-term (ceasing or diminishing cross-gender behaviors) and longer-term outcomes
(only one of the eight children reported post-pubertal homosexual feelings; none was transves-
tite or transsexual) among eight children admitted to the psychiatric unit of a hospital where no
concerted behavior modification directed at cross-gender behavior was engaged in).
240. See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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For gay youth, if both the "gravely disabled or substantial risk of
injury" and the "least restrictive alternative" standards are imposed, it
will be difficult to justify inpatient care if the underlying diagnosis is
GID, ODD, mild depression or some other similar diagnosis. None of
these diagnoses is likely to meet the "gravely disabled or substantial risk
of injury" standard. Moreover, for most minors, treatment, if any,
would best occur on an outpatient basis.
B. Development of Treatment Alternatives
In order for the "least restrictive alternative" standard to be mean-
ingful, alternatives to inpatient treatment must be developed. As it be-
comes more difficult to commit adolescents when it is not appropriate,
pressure will increase to develop alternatives. As an example, a New
Jersey study was cited in an amicus brief filed in Parham.242 The study
supported the notion that individualized treatment results can be obtained
in cases where an advocate represented the child in pre-commitment
hearings.243 The amicus brief summarized the results in 209 cases in
which representation was provided to juveniles in commitment cases.2
All commitment decisions, whether made by parents or the State, or vol-
untarily by the juvenile, were reviewed.2 4 In approximately a third of
the cases, commitment was ordered or permitted to continue.246 In an-
other 18% of the cases, the minor's voluntary application for admission
was allowed.24 7 In just over 20% of the cases, the minors were released
to alternative placements.24 Thus, in a significant number of cases, al-
ternatives to inpatient treatment were arrived at through the efforts of the
collaboration of the advocacy and medical teams.249
For gay youth in particular, current treatment alternatives which
serve their unique needs are few and far between, and information about
242. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, Dept. Pub. Advocate, Div. of Mental Health Advocacy,
State of N.J. at 2, 18, 19, Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
243. Id. at 18-28.
244. Id. at 19 & n.21.
245. Id. at 10-11.
246. Id. at 19-21.
247. Id. at 20-21.
248. Id. at 19-20.
249. Id. at 18-21. In twenty-two cases (10.5%) commitment was ordered, and in thirty
cases (14.4%), commitment was permitted to continue. In thirty-eight cases (18.2%), volun-
tary applications for admission were accepted. In forty-four cases (21.1%), the juvenile was
released to an alternative placement (other than an inpatient placement) of varying sorts. In five
cases, the juveniles were either transferred to an out-of-state hospital or to a special education
program while institutionalized; five were remanded to jails or youth detention facilities. In the
remaining sixty-five cases (31.1%), juveniles were discharged either prior to a hearing, or after
the hearing.
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existing options is scarce. Studies have shown that the most effective
"treatment" for gay youth is alleviating the social isolation which they
experience."' When gay youth have the opportunity to participate in
peer support groups, they benefit greatly." Because of the lack of
treatment options or the lack of awareness of such options, they may ac-
tually opt for inpatient care instead of staying with their families or being
out on the street. If other alternatives are developed, it is more likely
that the gay youth will not be pushed into inappropriate commitments. 2
C. Right to Representation
Appointment of counsel is mandated for LPS wards and Roger S.
claimants. 3 There is no right to counsel during S.B. 595 reviews. 4 In
order for adolescents to make informed decisions when faced with possi-
ble commitment, they must have access to information about options, in-
cluding treatment alternatives. In addition, they need to be able to make
decisions under the least coercive circumstances possible. For gay youth
in particular, this will best be accomplished if representation of counsel is
required. If counsel is provided, all options, including inpatient treat-
ment, can be discussed and considered. More importantly, decisions can
be made without the potentially coercive influence of parents and medical
personnel.
The New Jersey study indicated that in most cases parents were
pleased with the involvement of counsel, including several parents whose
opinions changed from negative to positive during the course of the rep-
resentation.5 The amicus brief also indicated that "the presence of
counsel has led to exceptional judicial creativity in an area in which, most
likely, such creativity would be conspicuously absent but for the presence
of an adversarial role."256
250. John Gonsiorek, Mental Health Issues of Gay and Lesbian Adolescents, 9 J.
ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 114, 120 (1988).
251. Id.
252. Other options such as enabling gay or gay-friendly families to serve as foster families
must be developed. See Polikoff, supra note 72. In addition, health care providers and teach-
ers need to be educated about lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and questioning youth issues
so that they can respond appropriately when they interact with such youth dealing with devel-
opmental issues.
253. See supra notes 21, 40.
254. See supra note 67.
255. Amicus Brief, supra note 242, at 23.
256. Id. at 25.
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D. Prohibitions Against Uninformed Waivers
Roger S. and S.B. 595 claimants must affirmatively invoke due pro-
cess rights in order to obtain the respective review process. It is ironic
that while courts attribute to children an inability to make good decisions
for themselves, they permit children to "waive" their due process rights
by simply failing to invoke them. Roger S. seemed to acknowledge this
when it noted the suggestion that
a waiver of a minor should not be accepted unless accompanied by a
certificate of his counsel attesting that the attorney has consulted with
the minor about the proposed commitment, explained his right to protest
it, described possible alternatives and ascertained that the minor wished
to enter the hospital without a hearing. 2 7
As noted earlier, S.B. 595 data indicated that 54% of the minors
who requested independent clinical reviews withdrew their request."
With representation, it is quite likely that a number of the commitments
could be challenged successfully, given the high release rate also shown
by the data. 9 The New Jersey survey indicated that in just over 30% of
the cases in which reviews were conducted the minor was discharged,
either prior to or after the hearing.2" Another 21% of the minors went to
alternative placements." The preliminary data cited by CAMPHRA also
indicated significant differences between more formal Roger S. reviews
and the informal reviews under S.B. 595.2
As in the New Jersey system, all commitment decisions should be
reviewed, whether "voluntary" or not. This way, the court can make a
determination as to whether the "waiver" of rights is an informed and
competent one.
E. Meaningful Forums for Consideration of Alternatives
It is unclear what commitment review process best meets the needs
of gay youth. In LPS cases, an automatic certification or petition review
occurs if commitment beyond the initial seventy-two hours is sought.263
In addition, habeas petitions requiring a court or jury trial can also be
filed to challenge commitment or conservatorship petitions.264 Roger S.
reviews, as actually implemented on a county-by-county basis, take sev-
257. Roger S., 569 P.2d at 1296 n.10.
258. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
259. See id.
260. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
261. See id.
262. See supra notes 223, 224.
263. See supra note 20.
264. See supra note 21.
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eral different forms, but at a minimum require a pre-commitment hearing
(which need not be judicial), and a neutral and detached decision-
maker.m The S.B. 595 procedures require a post-commitment independ-
ent clinical review conducted by a disinterested psychiatrist.
26
It is clear that the protections in the private placement process need
to be strengthened. The current system depends upon self-regulation for
which there is little oversight. The dismal compliance rate with the re-
porting requirement demonstrates, at best, indifference to the concerns
reflected in the statute, or at worst, active disregard for the rights of mi-
nors. The current independent clinical review does not address the
unique concerns of gay children because there is nothing built into the re-
view system to ensure, for example, that the controversial nature of the
GID or ODD diagnoses will be considered.
Alternatively, new forums should be considered and implemented.
Team reviews similar to those which occur in the New Jersey system
could be adopted. Multi-disciplinary teams could review the commitment
recommendation and consider alternatives.267 Other creative dispute
resolution methods should be explored. For example, a mediation alter-
native should be examined.
F. Need for Additional Data, Research, and State Enforcement
In evaluating alternative procedures, it would be useful to have ad-
ditional data and research. To this end, several avenues of data collec-
tion and research should be pursued.
A starting point is an examination of release rates, that is, the rate of
successful challenges to commitment decisions. Studies similar to the
one conducted in New Jersey could be conducted for minors who are
committed through LPS, Roger S., and S.B. 595 procedures. These
studies could analyze rates at which reviews are requested, release rates,
and the types of placements, other than inpatient admission, with which
the minors are provided.
Second, the S.B. 595 reporting requirement must be enforced. The
reporting requirement applies to "mental health facilities" where the
service is paid for by a private insurer or private health services plan.2s
265. See supra notes 40, 41.
266. See supra note 64.
267. See Weithorn, supra note 121, at 832.
268. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6002.40(b), (c) (West, WESTLAW through 1997 por-
tion of 1997-98 Reg. Sess. and 1st Ex. Sess.). "Mental health facilities" is not defined in this
statutory section, but California Welfare and Institutions Code § 5500(c) (1984) defines "mental
health facilities, services or programs" as "any publicly operated or supported mental health
facility or program; any private facility or program licensed or operated for health purposes
providing services to mentally disordered persons; and publicly supported agencies providing
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It is disturbing that of 10,457 total admissions involving a psychiatric di-
agnosis, only 2127 admissions are accounted for in S.B. 595 reports
submitted to DM1-. 269 It is also disturbing that only 11 facilities reported
S.B. 595 data, while there were 378 different facilities submitting dis-
charge data with at least one psychiatric diagnosis. 7 Since fewer proce-
dural protections are provided to minors whose parents seek to admit
their children to private hospitals, and given the potential for economi-
cally, rather than treatment, driven decisions in private settings, the po-
tential for abuse is high. 71 This data gives the only available insight into
the effectiveness of the S.B. 595 review system. The reporting require-
ment provides the only current oversight protection governing the S.B.
595 review system and therefore compliance must be compelled. This
will require the legislature to allocate additional funds to DMH. DMH
could then be directed to develop regulations ensuring compliance with
the statutory requirements.
Conclusion
Due process protections for gay youth in the commitment process
should be strengthened to reflect developments in the law, changing so-
cietal attitudes toward sexual orientation and children, and controversial
psychiatric diagnoses and treatment. While additional research would
clarify the effectiveness of various approaches, at a minimum, the admis-
sion standard should be strengthened, a review should be mandatory in
all cases, and youth should have a right to representation.
Gay youth are a particularly vulnerable segment of our society, but
many of the arguments here apply with equal force to children in general.
Greater and greater numbers of children face institutionalization-not
only in terms of inpatient psychiatric admissions, but to the child welfare
system and juvenile justice systems, as well. All of these children need
protections to ensure that decisions are made to improve their lives and
solve underlying problems, rather than make them worse.
other than mental health services to mentally disordered clients." Applying this definition to
the S.B. 595 reporting requirement, all of the facilities which reported discharge data, except
for county hospitals, should have reported data to DMH.
269. See supra notes 223, 229 and accompanying text. Discharge records were sorted ac-
cording to expected payment source. The 10,457 admissions represent all admissions for which
the expected payment source was one of the following: HMO, PPO, Private Insurance Com-
pany (not HMO, not PPO), or Blue Cross/Blue Shield (not HMO, not PPO). These payment
sources all come within the ambit of California Welfare and Institutions Code § 6002.40(b), (c)
(West, WESTLAW through 1997 portion of 1997-98 Reg. Sess. and 1st Ex. Sess.) and should
be accounted for by S.B. 595 reports.
270. See supra notes 223, 229. Only those facilities which reflected at least one admission
in which the expected payment sources were private insurers or private health services plans
were included.
271. See supra Part II.C.3.
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Dear Desperate, continued:
I hope that you never have to face being committed by your parents.
If you do, I hope you understand what your rights are and that in Cali-
fornia you can challenge your parents' decision. You should also know
that there are people who think that commitments shouldn't happen
when the reason is a child's sexual orientation. I hope that these people
are successful at changing the law so that it better protects kids like
you.
I wish you the best of luck.
